


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DEFENCE
STUDIES



EVOLUTION OF THE FINNISH MILITARY DOCTRINE 1945-1985

Pekka Visuri

DOCUMENTATION

War College Helsinki 1990

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
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FINLAND

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DOCUMENTATION



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INTRODUCTION

Purpose and approach

Three main phases can be distinguished in the development of the Finnish *national defence* following the Second World War:

1. Establishment of the peacetime organization of the Defence Forces 1945 – 1955.
2. Development of a total national defence to meet the new state-of-affairs 1956 – 1965.
3. Introduction of a territorial defence doctrine and organization, and the integration of defence policy with the security policy, from the mid-1960s onwards.

There was no sharp break between the three phases, and people at the time may not have been aware of any dramatic changes about 1955 and 1965. These phases, closely tied to the shaping of Finnish security policy, nevertheless, provide a useful conceptual framework for a historical study of the evolution of Finnish military doctrine.

Finnish military doctrine has never been formulated in terms of specific lines of action or rigid dogmas. In fact, the whole concept has been used sparingly, reflecting a general reluctance to issue pronouncements in the area of security policy. The doctrine must rather be sought in practical actions and in individual official and non-official statements. Reports by parliamentary defence committees and statements and planning guidelines issued by the Government Defence Council can be regarded as declarations of the doctrine, but even these were not binding and contained only general recommendations.

Relatively few studies have been done on Finnish post-war political and military history, as researchers have principally concerned themselves with the role of Finland in the run-up to and during the Second World War. The need for a comprehensive

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general outline of Finnish post-war military doctrine has now been recognized.

In my doctoral dissertation *From Total War to Crisis Management*,¹ I compared the evolution of Finnish military doctrine with developments in Austria, Switzerland and West Germany. The present study, which is based on the dissertation, is intended for international use and focuses on Finland.

My aim is to show how the Finnish military doctrine evolved and explain the factors determining it. Attention is thus on the evolution in its causal setting. The development of doctrine is examined in chronological order and from top to bottom, i.e. from the security policy (strategic) level down to the operational – tactical (battle doctrine) level giving instructions for the employment of troops.

Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of the study is provided by *Carl von Clausewitz's* concepts of the nature of war and the intimate relationship between war and politics. Political realism and neo-Clausewitzian theory allow the original ideas to be adapted to serve peacetime strategy and the prevention of war in the nuclear age.²

Neo-Clausewitzian thinking became part of strategy in Finland as well as many other European countries, partly through national experiences and partly through the French school, *Raymond Aron* and *André Beaufre* in particular. Beaufre's theories of total strategy and dissuasive deterrence were early put into practical use by neutral countries, but only about the mid-1960s did they begin to be incorporated in security policy and defence doctrine in Finland.

Important factors influencing Finnish military doctrine include the aims of security policy and strategy, foreign policy, the internal and international political situation, threat perceptions, military technology, geography, historical background and economic resources. Although this study generally examines relevant factors in chronological order, i.e. according to the progression of events, an exception is made in Chapter 1 where the military-political position of Finland and

especially the military-geographical factors prevailing during the post-war period are described.

The description of military doctrine pays more attention to its realization in practice than to specific pronouncements, which in any case has been shunned in Finland. Discovering the real situation is also somewhat hampered by the classified status of the operative plans and orders drafted for the event of war.

The doctrine is analysed vertically, from top to bottom, in order to take into account the quite different and often conflicting logic prevailing on different levels of strategy, as pointed out by *Edward N. Luttwak*.³ To comprehend the doctrine in its entirety, it is necessary to examine all the levels: strategic, operational and tactical.

Sources and previous research

Archival material on the Finnish defence administration from 1945–1950 is now relatively freely available. The post-war defence system, which is largely still in place, was established at that time. Though many documents on foreign affairs and defence administration continue to be classified, the diaries of President *J. K. Paasikivi* for the years 1945–1956 shed valuable light on foreign and defence policy decision-making in this important period.⁴ Research on the *Kekkonen* years, from 1956 onwards, is difficult.

The *Public Record Office* in London houses a large number of documents assisting analysis of the factors influencing Finland's strategic position and defence policy. These, as well as material in the American National Archives in Washington D.C., have been consulted in this study.

Finland's post-war foreign and defence policies, have mainly been examined from the top, as recorded in studies and memoirs. Thanks in particular to books by *Max Jakobson*⁵ the principal lines of presidential foreign policy and diplomacy have been made public.

Two new works on defence policy are now available to the international community. *Risto Pentttilä* examines in his doctoral dissertation⁶ the role of Finnish defence policy during 1944–1967 as part of security policy, and *Tomas Ries* presents an overall

picture of the Finnish defence in his book 'Cold Will'.⁷ Although both deal with it to some extent, neither work focuses specifically on military doctrine. My specific aim in the present study is to enhance understanding of the operational-tactical as well as the strategic part of the doctrine.

1 STARTING POINT FOR DOCTRINE: THE GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION OF FINLAND

1.1 *Arrival of the Cold War in the North*

At the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union was left in uncontested control of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Uncertainty prevailed in the Nordic countries as to the underlying intentions of the Soviet Union, despite its efforts to calm the atmosphere and secure its own reconstruction.

The Soviet Union refrained from pressuring Denmark and Norway into concessions of territory or military bases, despite some suggestions in this direction during the final stages of the war and immediately thereafter.⁸ The Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Finnmark in the autumn of 1945 and from Bornholm in the spring of 1946.⁹

A relatively peaceful period prevailed up to the end of 1947, when the Cold War began to move into Northern Europe. *Denmark* had initially pursued a neutrality policy favourable to the Soviet Union, even to the extent of offering co-operation in training. Relations began to deteriorate in 1948, however, as the situation on the Continent became more strained and talks leading up to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance began.

Sweden entered the post-war period by continuing her policy of neutrality and maintaining strong armed forces. She too displayed a conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Union by granting a one-billion Krona loan and returning refugees from the Baltic republics. At the same time she maintained good relations with the West. In late 1946 signs of the Cold War became more obvious, Sweden began to explore the possibility of a defence alliance with Norway and Denmark. There seemed to be a material basis for this in Sweden's strong economy and defence capability. An alliance among the Nordic countries would also ease the position of Finland by keeping the Great Powers out of Northern Europe. Great Britain at first welcomed the idea

of a Scandinavian bloc, but both the Soviet Union and the United States opposed it. Nor were the negotiations of 1948 between the Nordic countries easy, given the diverse interests and growing competition between the Great Powers.

Norway attempted to maintain her neutrality and assume a bridge position until as late as 1948, although her ties with the West continued strong. However, even in 1947 the deteriorating situation forced Norway to explore the possibility of obtaining political and armed assistance from the Western Powers or Sweden. In the following year Norway negotiated with Great Britain and the United States on participation in the future North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and discussions were held with Sweden and Denmark on the Scandinavian alliance. Eventually Norway decided that the alliance was a weaker option than the Atlantic Treaty, which had the support of the United States.¹⁰

The strategic importance of Northern Europe to the West began to grow with the deteriorating situation on the Continent. Assessments made at the beginning of 1947 still did not attach great value to Northern Europe. However, in June of that year the British Chiefs of Staff Committee emphasized the importance of Scandinavia, especially as an airbase but also in respect of its industrial and demographic strength.¹¹

The favourable position that the *Soviet Union* enjoyed immediately after the war began to erode in 1948. This was largely the result of the harsh Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, its opposition to a Scandinavian defence alliance, and the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed with Finland. The pressure put on Norway and Denmark to stay out of NATO was at least partially effective: although Norway and Denmark did join NATO, they refused to allow permanent deployment of foreign troops in their territory.¹²

Although on the losing side in the war, *Finland* legitimized her international position with the signing of the Peace Treaty in February 1947. Despite the large cession of territory and the heavy reparations, life eventually began to return to normal. The tense situation in Europe in early 1948 was not without repercussions in Finland: the Soviet Union took the initiative to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with Finland and there was threat of a Communist takeover like that which had occurred in

Czechoslovakia. After the parliamentary elections in June, the Finnish People's Democratic League, which was dominated by the Communists, were left out of the Government. The relations between Finland and the Soviet Union subsequently chilled.

Between February 1948 and the spring of 1949 a situation emerged that was later to be called the "Nordic Balance". The negotiations proposed by the Soviet Union to Finland were followed by similar Western advances to Norway. Sweden was the country that would tip the scales. The strength of the Finnish rebuttal evidently surprised the Soviet Union and had a role in improving the bargaining position of Finland in March and April. (The situation was analogous to that in March 1940, when the offer by Great Britain and France to send an expeditionary force to Finland served to speed up the peace negotiations ending the Winter War). Later on, the concept of a Nordic Balance was criticized for being too mechanical and the Finns at least did not find it very realistic. Rather, they preferred the concept of "Nordic Stability".¹³

In spite of its neutrality, Sweden, the key power in the North, became the front-line against the Soviet Union on the Baltic Sea in the early 1950s. Sweden further strengthened its defences, particularly to be able to repel invasion from the east. The Swedish Air Force had already been reinforced in the post-war years e.g. by the purchase of 150 U.S. surplus Mustang fighters. The 210 new Vampire jet fighters procured from England in 1948 were state-of-the-art. For its part, the Swedish aircraft industry started to produce modern equipment both for interception and for ground attack. It was estimated that the Swedish Air Force, with its nearly one thousand aircraft, could successfully repel a major Soviet offensive on the open sea. The navy was also considered to have great combat preparedness, although its relative importance had gradually diminished. Sweden's defence decision of 1948 called for a further development of land forces guided to organization and doctrine of the armed forces in response to the increased threat to her land borders. The policies built on the experiences gained in the Second World War continued well into the 1950s, when (in 1954) developments of military policy and weapons technology abroad suggested the need for nuclear arms of its own.¹⁴

Sweden's armed neutrality provided Finnish security policy

with something to rest on. By the 1950s, it already seemed feasible to emphasize the advantages of Finnish neutrality and the importance for the security of the whole of Northern Europe of forming a wide neutral zone together with Sweden. The full tensions of the Cold War were initially limited to the Baltic Sea, and it was only in the early 1970s that the strategic importance of the northern sea areas increased dramatically.

1.2 *Features of the Finnish military geography*

The geostrategic position of Finland in Fennoscandia gives it both a maritime and continental character. Historically the country's strategic importance has been closely linked with her fronting on the Baltic Sea. However, the long land borders and the vast, rugged terrain, combined with a northern climate remain in the end the primary military-geographical features when considering the operational – tactical employment of troops.

Geographical factors affecting strategy in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region in the 1950s are shown in figure 1. The figure demonstrates how the experiences of the Second World War affected the conception of naval strategy in the Baltic and of the likely offensive operations by German and Soviet land forces. Northern railway connections and Swedish iron ore were also held important. Signs of the new times were the air routes from the west over Scandinavia and the sea route from the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic, vital to the Soviet Union.¹⁵

Almost all of Fennoscandia, in both shape and terrain, is difficult territory for land operations, although it bears notice that during the Second World War a total of ten divisions were operating in Lapland. However, southern Sweden and the coastal areas of Finland up to about 100 km inland are areas well suited for operations of modern land forces.

The Baltic Sea was of great significance during both world wars, though less significant than the Russians had expected. After the Second World War, assessments of its strategic importance varied. The Baltic Sea has since emerged as a vital transportation route, which in the event of war would be at the mercy of air forces, submarines and anti-ship missiles.

The Baltic Sea is important to Finland in several respects.

As a route for foreign trade and internal communication it is vital. Population, industry and the public administration are concentrated in the coastal areas and in what is known as "Maritime Finland", the area south-west of the line joining Vaasa and Hamina. The length of the territorial sea boundary (1,650 km) presents problems for the surveillance of the seas and naval defence.

Physical geographical features of Finland with military importance include:

- the elongated shape (length 1,160 km and width 540 km),
- the large lake districts in central and eastern Finland,
- the vast differences between the south and the north in terrain, climate and communication routes,
- relatively low relief of the land,
- broken terrain in the South,
- the large proportion of boggy land (20 - 30% of the land area),
- vastness of the forests, especially in central and eastern Finland (the average for the whole country in the 1940s was 70%, in the 1980s 65%),
- the small proportion of arable land (9% in the whole country, 50% in parts of the coastal area),
- the great differences in temperature and daylight hours between summer and winter.

The limitations placed by weather and visibility on air force operations vary widely with season and latitude. While the differences between summer and winter are greatest in Lapland, they are still considerable in central Finland.

Post-war *demographic development* has seen two major changes. Population density was greatly increased by the loss of Karelia and the migration west of half a million refugees. Then, during the late 1940s there was a dramatic increase in the birth rate. Another dramatic change occurred in the 1960s when a large part of the population relocated in the south, mostly in cities and towns, and another large group emigrated to Sweden. Relative to the wartime (1940) situation, the population in the southernmost province of Uusimaa has now doubled.

The occupational structure has likewise undergone considerable change. In 1940 52% of the population worked in agriculture, whereas by 1965 the distribution was 35% in industry,

30% in service occupations and only 35% in agriculture. In 1985 only 13% of the population was employed in agriculture and 25% in industry. Trade transport and service occupations now make up the dominant share.

A sharp increase of personnel employed in computer technology and data communications, i.e. information services, occurred in the 1980s. This is not without military implication, since surveillance, intelligence, command and weapons systems all require competence in modern computer technology. Furthermore, the rapid development of the Finnish electronics industry has improved the self-sufficiency in communications and military data processing equipment.

The urbanization of the population and the increasing move to the service sector, together with the regional demographic changes, have greatly influenced the quality and regional distribution of reserves, which is of considerable significance to both defence planning and training.

The development of the *road network and transport equipment* has changed the entire life style of the country, and this has also affected defence decisions. In the first post-war decade, much of the road network was reconstructed or repaired, but even then the overall quality remained rather poor. The situation did not improve until the building of the major highways in the following decade. The programme has since been continued, mainly concentrating on qualitative improvements, and the Finnish road network is now, at least from the military standpoint, of good quality.

Regional differences in the road network nevertheless remain great. The roads in Southern Finland are of Western European quality in places. In particular, the road network in the Helsinki area is dense and in good condition, serving the traffic needs of approximately 800,000 residents. The road network in Lapland is sparse, although there has been considerable improvement since the war. Logging roads considerably improve the possibilities for operational – tactical mobility in Lapland.

Finland's economic and cultural geography since the Second World War has evolved along the lines of Western European countries. Even from the operational – tactical point of view southern Finland has been compared to Western European countries in several studies.

Northern Finland is sharply different from both continental Europe and Southern Finland. As an operational area it requires special equipment and methods. A strategic problem has also been created for Finland by the large-scale migration of the population to the southern part of the country, at the same time as the military-political position of the North has become more exposed.

2 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DEFENCE FORCES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

2.1 *The experiences and legacy of wartime*

Finland's defence doctrine after she gained her independence in 1917 was subject to influences from many directions. The newly formed Army had several high-ranking officers who had been trained in Russia, e.g. Generals Mannerheim and Nenonen. Armaments and fortifications were originally almost entirely Russian. Another strong influence came from the Jaeger Staff, which had been trained in Germany, and the field manuals they brought with them. Furthermore, the victor nations of World War I – France, the United Kingdom and Italy – and Finland's neutral neighbour, Sweden, all provided trainers and offered the Finns opportunities for military studies.

The *tactics* of the war years 1939–1945 were mainly based on Finnish national thinking and practical experience. Battles were fought under radically different conditions, which meant that troops also had vastly different experiences. During the Winter War, the conditions in Southern and Northern Finland were also clearly different. On the Karelian Isthmus, the decisive area, position battles were fought, much like those on the Western Front during World War I. Finnish troops successfully applied original, versatile tactics on the 1,000- km-long eastern border between Lake Ladoga and the Arctic Ocean, frequently interdicting enemy supply routes with encirclement and 'motti' tactics. Often they successfully overcame the enemy, although there were also many cases of persistent enemy resistance within encirclements.

The relevance of war experiences is hotly argued in armies of all nations, not least in Finland. Most often the target of criticism has been methods which, successful in some situations, were re-applied less successfully in others. The several competent studies on Finnish battle experiences done in the post-war years have had significant influence on the subsequent development of military doctrine.

War experiences based on both the studies and individual impressions were used as the basis for field manuals and proposals for reconstruction. The experiences of the final year of war, 1944, continued to exert the strongest influence and thus warrant closer examination.

The decisive battles in the summer of 1944 were fought in the Karelian Isthmus, particularly in the area north-west of Viipuri, between about 25 Russian and 11 Finnish divisions. A concentrated defensive fire was the primary reason for the Finnish victory in the great battle of Tali - Ihantala, when approximately 20 artillery battalions fired at the enemy formations in one target area. Another characteristic, which was profoundly different from battles of the Winter War in the same area, was the speed of encounters. Battles were often decided in a matter of hours. As both the attacker and the defender were forced to manoeuvre their troops on short notice and in confused circumstances, the command and battle formations changed so rapidly that a rigid organization and bureaucratic command became a burden.

The Finns halted the Soviet offensive in the final battles in the North Karelian forests and destroyed nearly two divisions with their stand-by encirclement tactics. By contrast, the experience of fighting the Germans in Lapland in autumn 1944 were heavily coloured by the difficult political situation, although these experiences in northern conditions were later to assume importance.

The *total strength* of the Finnish Defence Forces in July 1944 was 528,000 troops, 36,000 of which were non-combatant women. The strength of actual combat forces was approximately 450,000 men. Land forces comprised 14 infantry divisions and one armoured division, five infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade (dismounted).

The strength of the field artillery and the ample stores of ammunition could be considered particularly important in an assessment of the post-war defence capacity. At the end of the war, the field artillery consisted of 85 artillery battalions, 47 of them light artillery and 38 heavy. In addition there were separate heavy and super heavy artillery batteries. The artillery totalled 1,025 field guns and 2,12 million rounds of ammunition, i.e. 2,000 for each gun.

The war experiences supporting the establishment of Finnish

post-war *security policy and strategy* were highly contradictory. And there was little time for objective assessment during the ensuing political upheaval. The terms dictated by the victorious powers had to be adhered to first, with the Soviet security interests as a priority.

The Finnish experiences of collective security (the League of Nations) and neutrality policy, and also of forming a military alliance, were discouraging. It was again apparent that, in crisis situations, all nations concentrate on their own, often immediate strategic interests, and put little weight on international solidarity, moral principles or ideology.

The pre-war planning in the 1930s was based on the possibility that the Soviet Union would attack Finland – as indeed happened. But neither military nor political leaders had anticipated the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939 and Germany's participation in the blockade of Finland. The reliance on Sweden for assistance had not proved entirely satisfactory. Nor did the peacetime planners envisage that the Finnish troops would need to land at Tornio close to the Swedish border in the autumn of 1944 in order to drive the Germans out through the north, on the order of the Soviet Union. After such experiences strategists found it difficult to believe on the stability of any situation.

Strategy and operative decisions made during the Second World War were carefully studied in Finland, and much was written on the subject. One of the most interesting events in an educational sense was the German attack on Norway in April 1940. There was a clear strategic logic in this, as in general in other operations during the Second World War: for Germany it was both necessary and advantageous to continue the war by invading Norway. Germany ventured to start a seemingly bold operation knowing that the Norwegian defence was weak and England would not be ready in time to intervene with sufficient strength. For its part, Germany gained important strongholds through taking the offensive, and prevented English penetration into Scandinavia, which had only just begun.

The Norwegians themselves determined that there should never again be a repeat of April 1940. In addition to their own experiences, the Finns had reason to conclude from the events in Norway that, during war, or even before it, a strategically

important territory will necessarily attract competitive parties. Only defence preparedness, maintained over a sufficiently long time, can secure the aims of neutrality. At least during the Second World War no nation could afford to engage troops in offensive operations of uncertain outcome.

As a legacy of war Finland had gained wide battle experience and trust in her own fighting capability and equipment, and she had a reserve of trained men for the various service branches, especially for the infantry and artillery- based Army. But politically and strategically, the experiences were such as to cast doubt on the future of a small nation. The heavy losses hung as a pall and burdened the economy for years, even decades.

2.2 *Interim peace*

Fighting against the Soviet Union ended in a ceasefire on 5 September and the *Armistice Agreement* was signed in Moscow on 19 September 1944. The terms of the Agreement contained two Articles highly pertinent to the National Defence. First, Finland undertook to disband the German troops remaining in the country, which led to the devastating war in Lapland. Second, she undertook to “place her army on a peace footing within two and a half months”.

An *Allied Control Commission* (ACC) formed by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom arrived in Finland to ensure that the terms of the Armistice Agreement were observed. Colonel General Andrey Zhdanov, one of Stalin’s closest aides and Party Leader in Leningrad, came to serve as the Commission chairman. Now as the Finns were quite aware, Zhdanov was the man in charge when the Soviet Union annexed Estonia in the summer of 1940. The Commission had almost unlimited authority to inspect any sites they wished and to issue detailed orders regarding the implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

In the autumn of 1944 the Finns were very uncertain as to Soviet intentions and possible secret agreements between the Allies. All that was known was that the demand for unconditional surrender presented to Germany and its allies in 1943, in a joint decision by the Allies, did not include Finland. The Finns did not then know that the Soviet Union had wanted to conclude a

final peace treaty immediately and had only consented at the last minute, under pressure of her allies, to sign the Armistice Agreement.¹⁶

Finland had learned of the heavy terms of armistice imposed on Rumania during the same period, including the order to pit a minimum of 12 divisions against Germany. While Rumania was changing sides, the Germans occupied important positions and, in spite of the armistice, the Soviet troops continued their advance and went on to occupy Rumanian cities.

It was during this confused period in September that the decision to carry through an earlier planned *concealment of weapons* in scattered caches was made by officers of the General Headquarters. Concealment of weapons during troop demobilization was contrary to the orders issued by the Allied Control Commission to establish central depots, and when the operation became publicly known in the following summer it created an external and internal crisis. The Soviet Union did not, however, react to this in the manner feared. A statement to the effect that it was an act organized by the General Headquarters and not a conspiracy of "Fascist factions" appeared to satisfy them.

The concealment of weapons and the hasty transfer of intelligence materials to Sweden (the Stella Polaris Operation) created long-lasting rifts in the relations between the political administration and the Defence Forces. Staff relations within the Defence Forces also deteriorated significantly. The concealment of weapons provided the extreme left with fuel for internal political agitation and a propaganda campaign against the Defence Forces. For its part, the extent of the organization for the concealment of weapons, (arms for 35,000 men), and the many still undiscovered caches, provided a warning of stiff resistance in the event of an attempted Communist coup or Soviet occupation.

The *peacetime organization* of the Defence Forces and the method employed for the demobilization of reservists led to some disagreements with the Allied Control Commission (ACC), but these were quickly resolved. It was agreed that the organization should basically be the same as in early 1939. On their own initiative the Finns also put a stop to the preparations for mobilization in January 1945, even though this was not directly

required by the ACC.

The organization of the coastal defence and the equipment for the Coast Artillery proved problematic and became an important issue of security policy. Towards the end of 1944 the ACC demanded that the Coast Artillery be limited to one regiment and two separate artillery battalions (a total of 140 guns) and that any guns over 120 mm be transferred to inland depots. It also demanded that submarines be disarmed and stripped of their navigation equipment. The issue was not resolved until after negotiations and correspondence between Zhdanov and President Marshall Mannerheim. Mannerheim proposed to the Soviet Union that the Coast Artillery should be kept in place and that co-operation in naval defence in the Gulf of Finland should be begun, in the interests of both countries. Zhdanov advised Mannerheim in March that the ACC was willing to let the large calibre guns remain in the fortifications to the west of Porkkala if Finland would undertake to protect the Soviet Navy in coastal waters and when moored in Turku, Hanko and the archipelagoes. Submarines would be temporarily "conserved", i.e. kept operational but in storage.¹⁷

The dismantling of the Coast Artillery to the west of Porkkala was thus halted and provisional arrangements for co-operation in naval defence were worked out. Discussions were held between Mannerheim, Paasikivi and Zhdanov on a permanent agreement to cooperate in the event of a new war, modelled after the agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia and France. The matter came to a temporary halt in the spring when Zhdanov advised that the Soviet Union would make a proposal when the time was ripe.¹⁸

2.3 Military clauses in the Paris Peace Treaty

Already in the spring of 1945 the United Kingdom had learned of the Finnish – Soviet negotiations towards organizing military co-operation and possibly even a military alliance. The British had also learned of the return of the armaments to west coast fortification and they especially feared that the Åland fortifications would be put at Soviet disposal.¹⁹ The British Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended in the summer of 1945 that the

peace treaty with Finland should limit her armed forces in the same manner as to the other former German "satellites". The demilitarization of Åland should also be assured. Although Finland was not militarily important to the United Kingdom at the time, Scandinavia in general was becoming more important to the West.²⁰

During a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Allied powers in London in September 1945 to draft the peace treaties for Italy, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, differences became apparent in the views of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the restrictions to be imposed on the armed forces. While there was general agreement on the restrictions to be set on Italy, the Soviet Union did not regard it as necessary to set such restrictions on small nations. According to the minutes of the meeting (20 September), the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov said:²¹

It could not be supposed that Finland could threaten the peace of Europe. The Soviet Union, which was the country most directly concerned with the possibility of Finnish aggression, had not asked for any restrictions on her military establishments in the Treaty made in 1940, and did not think them necessary now. Finland would never undertake a war of aggression without some powerful Ally such as Germany; the correct policy was, therefore, to prevent Germany from becoming capable of further aggression, rather than to make demands upon Finland, which were not justified by necessity and would affront her national pride.

An agreement on Finland might have been reached had not the United Kingdom and the United States held out unconditionally for the restrictions because of the situation in the Balkans. There was a risk that Bulgaria and Rumania would launch an attack on Greece, which was supported by the West. The United Kingdom was planning an army of approximately 100,000 men for Greece and the strength of the armed forces of the bordering countries would need to be sufficiently restricted to eliminate the risk of aggression. Disputes over the draft document and its military clauses continued in secret meetings until the actual start of the Peace Conference in the summer of 1946. After a series of negotiations and ever tougher demands,

equal restrictions were set on all former German satellite states.²²

Finland was not informed of the military clauses until their content was almost finalized, and the proposals for amendment that she made to the Peace Conference were then of no effect. Against the harshness of all the other conditions of the Treaty, the military clauses were not, in the final analysis, felt to be of catastrophic significance by the Finns, despite their efforts to have the restrictions lightened. In fact the worst penalties, besides the cession of territory, were the economic (reparations) and political articles.

The genesis of the military clauses and the interests of the various signatories remained unclear to Finnish political and military leaders. It was not known in Finland that the articles were originally intended only as provisional i.e., to comply with the current military and political situation and state of military technology.

The primary responsibility for the general control of armaments was to be left to the UN. Any amendments to the peace treaties required by the situation or by developments in technology were to be carried out under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council as stated in the relevant Article 22.²³ For practical reasons, the interpretation of the military clauses, nevertheless, began to bend, as the military – political situation rapidly changed with the onset of the Cold War. It also became apparent that the UN was not able to carry out armament control effectively.

According to Article 13 of the Peace Treaty, signed on 10 February 1947 in Paris the Finnish Armed Forces, were to be restricted to:

- A land army, including frontier troops and anti-aircraft artillery, with a total strength of 34,400 men;
- A navy with a strength of 4,500 men and ships to a total tonnage of 10,000 tons;
- An air force, including any naval air arm, of 60 aircraft, including reserve aircraft, with a total strength of 3,000 men. Finland should not possess or acquire any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

Article 18 of the Treaty prohibited the storage and acquisition of war material in excess of that required for the maintenance of

armed forces as permitted under Article 13. Article 19 required that Finland should hand over all excess war material to the Allied Powers or dispose of it within one year.

By 1948 the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had still not reached an agreement on the interpretation of the restrictions on strength and the excess war material. Finland supplied the appropriate information on strength and requested instructions for action. The Soviet Union refrained from taking a stand, and the Finns were not eager to force the issue. The United Kingdom demanded a strict interpretation of the agreement, arguing that the restrictions on strength should also mean, in practice, restrictions on the maintenance of reserve forces, i.e. a prohibition on preparations for mobilization. The 60 aircraft permitted for the Air Force should include all aircraft (i.e. also transport aircraft and trainers), and the excess war material should be handed over immediately the deadline expired. The United Kingdom felt that the Defence Forces of Finland, which had just signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, should be as severely restricted as possible.²⁴

In practice, the United Kingdom was not keen on starting an open dispute over this, as she feared foreign policy issues and was for several years satisfied with merely commenting on what she regarded as improper interpretations of the Treaty, mainly concerning aircraft. Finally, in the early 1950s, the United Kingdom saw it as unnecessary to press further for strict interpretations in the case of Finland²⁵, particularly since the limitations set on strength had also been exceeded by the other "satellite" nations and as the restrictions on the quality of weapons were gradually being abolished in the wave of general rearmament.

It is worth mentioning that the strength of the Greek Army, which was one of the original standards, had increased from the planned 65,000 – 100,000 men in 1946 to approximately 200,000 men by the end of 1947, showing that the principles of "maintaining the prevailing situation" was scarcely adhered to.

The Finns had retained sufficient war material for a land force of 15 divisions, e.g. 580,000 rifles, 61,000 submachine guns and 20,000 machine guns. By contrast, the equipment of both the air force and the navy was already obsolete or worn out by the end of the 1940s and no longer met the requirements of the

times. Preparations were already underway in other countries for the introduction of jet fighters and missiles, although development was still relatively slow prior to the Korean War.

The issue of excess weapons remained undecided until the end of 1952²⁶ and Article 17 forbidding all "special weapons" was uncompromisingly adhered to. An interpretation permitting defensive missiles was obtained from the signatory nations in 1962, and in the 1980s the main signatory nations also approved of the acquisition of proximity fuse mines. The original text of the Treaty was not amended, however; indeed, the quality and quantity restrictions remained in their original form as set down in the Peace Treaty.*

2.4 Defence Review Committee 1945–1949 and the principles of the doctrine

The new military – political situation in Finland after the Second World War required that the functions, position and organization of the Defence Forces should be thoroughly reviewed before the peacetime organization could be established. The Government appointed a parliamentary Defence Revision Committee in May 1945 to carry out the necessary studies. It comprised six MPs, most of them from leftist parties, and five military officers.

The report²⁷ was not completed until the spring of 1949, mainly because of the delay in receiving directives and interpretations of clauses in the Peace Treaty, the internal political conflicts and the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the spring of 1948. However, nothing really new emerged during the final stages and the report was ultimately based on the work done in 1945 and 1946.

The Committee was allowed to work relatively undisturbed, even though the political situation in the country was strained. Although the viewpoints of the members' different allegiances were presented, a rather general consensus prevailed over the

*) On September 21, 1990, the Finnish Government issued a statement to the effect that the stipulations of Part III of the Peace Treaty (the Military Clauses) had lost their significance.

major issues. The need to maintain defence capability was not questioned in principle. Proposals for keeping defence appropriations to a minimum were justified by the difficult economic situation and the exceptional post-war circumstances. Reviving the morale in military training was particularly desirable in order to improve the relations between the working classes and the Defence Forces. The aim was to create what was more specifically a "people's army".

The single most important document in the initial phase of drafting the basic decision on defence was the *Memorandum of 19 June 1945* issued by General of Infantry Erik Heinrichs.²⁸ He had written the memorandum on the basis of discussions held during the winter and spring with the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. When the Memorandum was presented, the Defence Revision Committee expressed surprise over how radically views had changed since the war years. The contents of the Memorandum were otherwise confidential for the time being.

According to Heinrichs, the North was becoming strategically important to the Great Powers and it would be advantageous for Finland to initiate an *agreement of co-operation with the Soviet Union*, whereby Soviet reserves could also be used to defend Finnish territory. The military command had already proposed similar co-operation in regard to the naval defence of the Gulf of Finland. However, a defence alliance with the Soviet Union was not to be recommended due to a conflict of interests. Neither had the Soviet Union entered into alliance agreements with any other former enemy nation. An alliance would also be in contradiction of the reasons for territorial concessions, which emphasized Soviet defence requirements. Even an agreement on co-operation should not sanction the employment of Finnish troops outside Finnish frontiers. The conclusion of a peace treaty should also be a precondition for any agreements.

Basic principles for the establishment of a military doctrine began to take shape within the General Staff of the Defence Forces in the summer of 1945. Major General K. A. Tapola, Director of the War College, argued that while new weapons should be taken into consideration, they would not revolutionize warfare in the short run. An effective defence capability would still be needed (mainly fast deployment forces based on the regular army), and it would be advantageous for the country to

switch to a territorial defence system, as isolate battles could spring up rapidly over an extensive area. Tapola also emphasized the importance of a territorial organization, responsible for the mobilization of reserves and supported the integration of such an organization into the permanent military framework.²⁹

The principle of *territorial defence*, with the idea of regionally subordinating all defence operations under one unified command, received early approval in the Defence Revision Committee. The organization of the Civic Guards, as an essential part of the National Defence, had during the war carried out territorial conscription, mobilization and rear security assignments. After the Civic Guards were disbanded in the autumn of 1944 the military districts had sole responsibility for carrying out the assignments of the territorial organization. The political left opposed the territorial organization, however, as being too closely identified with the Civic Guards and its political views. A target for defence savings was also sought, as, according to calculation, the territorial organization, which was responsible for conscription and mobilization preparedness, was tying up a minimum of 467 officer posts.

The issue of the territorial organization and the importance of mobilization operations remained somewhat controversial during the entire period of defence review. There was, however, an effort to smooth the issue by changing the name of the military districts to "conscription districts", so that their preservation would not later cause any conflict of principles. The Report of the parliamentary Committee also sought to integrate the territorial organization with the regular troops.

Even after Finland received information on the draft of the *Peace Treaty* in the autumn of 1946, the General Headquarters and the Defence Revision Committee were uncertain of its interpretation. Nor did the signing of the Treaty in February 1947 do anything to clarify the practical implications of the restrictions on strength and the obligation to cede "excess war material". The beginning of Part III of the Treaty contained the following statement: "The maintenance of land, sea and air armaments and fortifications shall be closely restricted to meeting tasks of an internal character and local defence of frontiers." The upper limit of the strength of the Defence Force, 41,900 men, was interpreted by the Committee as a applying to the peacetime

situation and therefore a large number of reserve troops should be trained for wartime defence of the country.

The *Report of the Defence Revision Committee* released in the spring of 1949 discusses Finnish military-geographical conditions and other strategic aspects in detail. The defence capability of the country was considered important and the aim of neutrality was also mentioned: "It is perfectly clear that no country will guarantee our neutrality and territorial integrity without some benefit to itself, in other words without gaining advantages in one form or another." The aim is to be prevention of war by defence preparedness: "Effective Defence Forces can by their mere existence prevent an attack on the country and the lack of such forces could draw the country into war." This principle is analogous to the Swiss "dissuasive strategy", which proved so effective during the Second World War.

The Report proposed a cadre system, based on general conscription, although it included some characteristics of a militia system. Psychological factors and "popularity" were considered to be important and easy to achieve with this system.

For the basic model of organization the Report recommended a "territorial system", with which the regular troops would be closely associated. This model would enable a fast and effective move from peacetime to wartime organization.

2.5 1948: a year of defence policy decisions

The central issue of Finnish post-war foreign and military policy, i.e. the country's relations with the Soviet Union, received a solution in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed in the spring of 1948. Finnish political and military leaders had already negotiated with Andrey Zhdanov, the chairman of the Allied Control Commission, during the confused situation of 1945. At that time Finns considered it in their interest to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union, whereby military co-operation would be undertaken in the event of a new war, mainly to ensure the naval defence of the Gulf of Finland. Finland sought to convince the Soviet Union that she had the capability at least to defend its own territory and thus protect the north-western Soviet flank, provided that the Finnish armed forces were not to be excessively reduced. As a political

guarantee, Finland would be willing to sign an agreement defining defence obligations as well as conditions for co-operation and assistance. This proposal for a military agreement was also an attempt to obtain concessions on the terms of the forthcoming Peace Treaty.

At the time of signing the Paris Peace Treaty, in February 1947, President *Paasikivi* had stated in an interview with the magazine of the Finnish-Soviet Society that Finland would fight, in co-operation with the Soviet Union, within its own borders, to repel any attack made on the Soviets. Later, however, in the tense political atmosphere of 1947, *Paasikivi* was not prepared to sign even a limited agreement on military alliance, which might have bound Finland to the emerging Eastern Bloc and result in a break off of trade and cultural relations with the West. A crucial reason for his change of mind was the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty with the harsh terms it imposed on Finland. It was too late now for any agreement on military alliance to bring about the concessions to the Peace Treaty that had been hoped for in the spring of 1945.

On 22 February 1948 *Stalin* sent an invitation to Finland to begin discussions toward the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FMCA). *Paasikivi* accepted the invitation only after long deliberation. A military alliance was widely opposed in Finland except by the Finnish People's Democratic League (communists).³⁰ At the same time the Western Powers were preparing to rally troops to prevent a Soviet invasion of Scandinavia and Communist coups in the bordering countries, such as the one that recently (in February) had taken place in Czechoslovakia.³¹ *Stalin's* invitation to Finland in turn triggered preliminary consultations on defence co-operation between the United States, Norway and England.

The treaty negotiations in Moscow went well for the Finns after all. The wording of the military articles³² as the main subject of negotiations, was greatly influenced by the expertise of General of Infantry *Heinrichs*. With hindsight, it can be said that the FCMA Treaty, signed on 6 April 1948, corresponded well with the political and military reality, satisfying both Finnish and Soviet interests. The role of the Finnish National Defence was also defined in fairly specific terms, though not specifically enough to prevent different interpretations. The contradiction

between the obligations set by the FCMA Treaty and the restrictions in the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty was obvious and was to cause considerable worry to the leaders and implementors of Finnish security policy in the ensuing years.

In two fundamental memoranda in March 1948, the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces, General of Infantry Aarne Sihvo, reported to the President on the feasibility and requirements of Finnish defence.³³ His main argument was that Finland would be able to fulfil her defence obligations towards the Soviet Union if she started to prepare for the use of reservists as wartime troops and if the procurement of material for the Defence Forces was resumed. On 13 March 1948 President Paasikivi approved the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, authorizing the General Headquarters to again start drafting operational plans and to prepare for the mobilization of reserves. The implementation of the decision proved to be difficult, however, due to the sensitive political situation.

The President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces also began to reinforce the protection of military installations and the state administration. There was reason to fear that the arms depots and important targets in the city could be taken-over and that the traffic to the Porkkala military base, from the Soviet Union, would be disturbed. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces informed the Soviet military attaché of the tightening up of surveillance and safeguarding. The preparedness of the Defence Forces for repelling the threat of takeover was at its peak in April, after which normal training was gradually resumed.

Studies undertaken since have not been able to determine how well founded the rumours of a plan for a Communist takeover actually were. The President's tough position was influenced by the consideration that provocation by even a small group could quickly lead to a crisis to which the Soviet Union might choose to react. The Government was determined to maintain order within the country at all costs. In this situation the Defence Forces proved to be a disciplined and reliable tool, playing the role of supporter of the Government's foreign and internal policy.

The uncertainty in internal policy continued for a

considerable time. In foreign and military policy Finland's position began to stabilize, however. She aimed at neutrality while maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union in accordance with the FCMA Treaty. At the same time she turned mainly to the West to satisfy her economic and cultural needs.

2.6 *Conscription Act of 1950 and organizational review of 1952*

The Conscription Act of 1932 called for conscription service generally lasting 350 – 440 days, but leaves of several months were granted after the war was over.

The Defence Revision Committee proposed in its Report that the new Conscription Act should follow the principles of the old one, but military service should be shortened. The Committee conceded that, in the light of war experiences, the proposed terms of duty of slightly less than a year were too short but they were justified by the economic situation.

The Government agreed in principle with the views of the Committee. The restrictions set by the Peace Treaty, and at the same time the obligation set by the FCMA Treaty "to defend the country by all available means", were noted in the Government's proposal. The parliament approved the Conscription Act on 2 June 1950. According to the terms of the Act, the basic term of duty would be 240 days, and for specialists and officers 330 days. In addition, 40 – 100 days participation in refresher training was to be obligatory.

The establishment of the *peacetime organization* proved to be a complicated and time-consuming task. A new "training organisation", including three divisions and one light brigade, had already been put in place in 1948. The Coast Artillery and Anti-Aircraft troops were incorporated in the Army for the time being.

The Defence Revision Committee Report proposed several transfers of troops and the division of the country into seven "national defence provinces" according to the principles of territorial defence. Troops were to be moved from the southern coastal areas and southeastern Finland so as to shift the centre of gravity more towards Western and Northern Finland. New garrisons were expensive to build, however, and the transfers

could not generally be carried out.

In his statements in 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sihvo, supported the main principles presented by the Defence Revision Committee, but he also made several comments on their practical implementations. He proposed three "national defence districts" (territorial divisions), and a brigade organization instead of the "national defence provinces" and division/regiment organization proposed by the Committee. General Sihvo's arguments for a brigade organization were as follows:

- An improved operational preparedness, flexibility and operational capability of the permanent fast deployment force;
- Improved suitability for securing internal order;
- Improved organization for peacetime training allowing co-operation between the branches of service.

In his counter-proposal the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces also wished to emphasize the importance of coastal defence and, accordingly, to keep the Coast Artillery incorporated in the Army. He further pointed out that the General Headquarters were the central command, and that both the Air Force and the Navy should manage with only small administrative bodies.

In October 1951, the Government adopted the principles worked out by the Defence Revision Committee, with certain amendments, mainly those proposed by the Commander-in-Chief. The number of military posts had been the subject of continual dispute between the Defence Forces and the politicians. The Government now proposed that the total number of regular officers and non-commissioned officers be 8,520, which meant a 1,500-man reduction in posts from the then current strength. The Act passed by Parliament on 6 June 1952 substantially followed the Government proposal.

The peacetime organization of the Defence Forces as established in 1952 comprised three army divisions with brigades and independent units under them. In addition, an armoured brigade and other independent units operated under the command of the General Headquarters. The Navy comprised two operational units and two naval stations. The Air Force had three wings, as well as independent units. The territorial organization, responsible for conscription and maintaining the

preparedness of reserves, comprised seven military areas, which were further divided into 27 military districts. The Frontier Guard was established as a military organization under the command of the Ministry of the Interior.

The creation of the *wartime organization* was further delayed. This was due mainly to the confusion over the interpretation of the maximum strength stipulated in the Peace Treaty, but also to the delicate nature of the prevailing political situation. There had been arguments within the Defence Forces over whether a division/regiment or brigade organization would be better. Opinions were also divided on the composition of the infantry and artillery units. The decision of 1952 in favour of a peacetime organization into brigades still did not entirely end the argument. However, training was eventually based on the brigade organization.

2.7 Political difficulties in improving the defence capability

The Defence Revision Committee had urged in its Report that defence preparedness be maintained at a high level. It was during this time that the military-political situation in the North once again became more strained.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Sihvo wrote two memoranda to the President in the winter of 1949, in response to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.³⁴ Sihvo argued that Finland's military-political position should be re-assessed. He thought the operational capability of the army to be sufficient, and that there were no threats of any serious naval operations either, but that the Air Defence was developing into a critical issue. The striking power of the United States and of the emerging Atlantic Alliance was based on air power which would probably also be employed in the North. In the event of war, a weak Finnish Air Defence would force the Soviet Union to spread its own defence onto Finnish territory, and Finland would unavoidably become the target of American atomic bombs. Sihvo proposed that radar equipment be quickly procured and the civil defence preparedness improved. Preparations should also be intensified regarding economic defence in the event of war or protracted crisis.

Money saving measures and the sale of equipment for either civilian use or scrap resulted in a clear decline in the preparedness of the Finnish Defence Forces in the early 1950s, especially relative to the vast rearmament started elsewhere. This development was openly acknowledged by the Government. For political reasons, however, it was cautious about taking explicit steps in the direction of enhancing the defence capability. President Paasikivi deemed the threat of war to be particularly great in 1951 – 1953 and was very worried about the weak preparedness for defence. He thought it essential that the defence obligations, as stipulated in the FCMA Treaty, be met as far as possible by Finland herself.³⁵

The problem for Paasikivi was the uncertainty over Soviet intentions. He believed that the vehement anti-defence stance of the Communists was orchestrated by Moscow.³⁶ On the other hand, the Soviet Union made it known on several occasions that the Finnish defence preparedness was in the Soviet interest and important to them. The Paasikivi Diaries Vol. 2 reveal the indecisiveness of the Government in the early 1950s over the lines of development for the Defence Forces. There was hesitancy over initiating preparations for mobilization and reluctance to establish a Defence Council as yet, although it was otherwise thought necessary. Paasikivi delayed a long time – until late in 1952 – before requesting permission from the Soviet Union to discharge the central depots. Enough post-war material for more than ten divisions was stored in the depots; to bring them into use during mobilization would, however, have taken several months.

The extreme caution on the part of both Paasikivi and the Government was not only due to the uncertainty over the Soviet reactions. Renewing the equipment of the Defence Forces, particularly that of the Air Force and Navy, would be extremely costly and the economic situation during the final stages of reparations and reconstruction was still weak. Increasing the defence budget, or even a public discussion of defence, it was feared, could trigger political unrest, and for this reason the Government carefully avoided emphasizing the needs of the Defence Forces in public.

It is difficult to decide whether, despite of the threat of war, it was internal politics that determined the restraint in improving

the defence capability in the early 1950s. Quite possibly foreign policy issues were simply used as an excuse.

The organization of the highest command of the National Defence was thought to be wanting. President Paasikivi often concerned himself with the issue, but no rapid improvement could be effected. The problem stemmed from the early years of independence. Only the President's constitutional position as Supreme Commander was generally accepted, and the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters were the source of much disagreement. Questions as to the administration of the civilian sectors in the National Defence were also left open.

The Defence Revision Committee had proposed that the *General Headquarters* be kept as the central military command in accord with wartime practice. At the same time they wanted the *Ministry of Defence* to assume more responsibility for defence administration and defence policy. This line was followed in principle in the reorganization of 1952. The Committee had proposed the appointment of a *Defence Council*, responsible for guidelines and the overall direction of the National Defence. The Prime Minister had been unanimously proposed as Chairman of the Council, but otherwise there was rather divergent opinion as to its composition and duties.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces had urged the appointment of a Defence Council in many of his proposals to the President and the Government during 1949 – 1951. Both thought the issue important but also delicate enough to warrant a delay in the appointment.

President Paasikivi wished to increase the power of the Government and its responsibilities in the National Defence, while himself still maintaining an active role in defence matters. Paasikivi issued an order to this effect in May 1951, saying that the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces should, prior to their presentation to the President, and otherwise as well if needed, inform the Ministry of Defence on the most important matters of military command such as appointments (colonels and generals), basic operational, organizational and mobilization issues, the conducting of large-scale exercises, agendas for consultative meetings, important announcements concerning the National Defence and the most important acquisitions. The

position of the *Minister of Defence* also assumed greater importance for the reason that Emil Skog, who had held the post for several years, was also the leader of the Social Democratic Party.

2.8 *Development of tactics*

Given the considerable unfinished business of the war, the drafting of standard orders, which would greatly affect the development of tactics, was not the most urgent issue on the agenda. The War College resumed operations in 1946, at which time the studies on war experience actually got under way. The concepts of "dense" and "sparse" defence were introduced into the instruction given at the War College. And the concept of lines of defence was changed to the concept of *defence position*.

The defence capability against an all-out attack on Southern Finland was understandably considered more important than training for "sparse defence". The battles fought on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1944 were still fresh in everyone's mind. It was generally accepted that a Great Power would be able to penetrate any rigid line of defence. Countermeasures were therefore needed, and these would have to be developed. The troops should learn to fight while encircled and to make counterattacks. A solution to these problems was hard to find, however.

In the early 1950s tactics were outlined in the *Officers' Manual* (editions of 1950 and 1953). The Manual was vital for the development of tactics, as it was avidly read and its writers were serving in the Defence Forces in high-ranking positions. The Manual recognized the concepts of total and territorial defence as the basis for the National Defence, but the battle doctrine was still based on a relatively rigid position defence. *Total defence* was defined to include "military defence, economic defence measures, protection of the civilian population and property (civil defence) and psychological warfare."

The National Defence should thus be seen as a common national task, where the military sector only represents a certain important part. The latter should not be construed as a separate sector, with

the sole responsibility for national defence. The supreme leaders of the nation, the President of the Republic, Government and Parliament, see to it that sufficient preparations are made, already in time of peace for the moment when the nation may face its most difficult decision, to begin total defence against total offensive.... The supreme leaders will also make the important decisions on the defence of the country. The duty of the Defence Forces is only to carry out the tasks assigned them.

A clear effort to separate National Defence from other duties required in the defence of the country is apparent in this text. The overall responsibility for the command of the national defence was unquestionably given to the political leaders. This was an effort to get rid of the practice in the last war where the Defence Forces had the responsibility for administration of the civilian sector, e.g. transport and civil defence.

The introduction of the *territorial defence system* was reasoned on the basis of the

changed nature of war, mainly the threat of a surprise attack even during the initial phase of war, its increasing totality, the possibility of internal unrest as well as the great operational mobility with deep penetrations and fast breakthroughs, airborne operations and amphibious landings. War, previously fought on solid frontier lines, has changed into territorial war and now involves the entire nation, together with its population and remotest areas.

According to the principles of territorial defence, all defence preparations and the operative command should be combined under the territorial command. The role of the General Staff and the General Headquarters was to assign the tasks and provide the resources for their implementation. However, it was not desirable that the territorial defence should get involved in local fighting of the troops; the familiar "conventional" wartime tactics were instead still to be employed.

The examples of "dense defence" by a brigade stressed the importance of the depth of formation, but also the linear nature of the defence.

The aim is to occupy a territory in depth. The defence of a rifle company is dense and efficient when its average deployment

covers an area of 1 km². The width and depth of the battalion will then be approx. 2 km, i.e. defence by the battalion can be considered dense if it covers an area of 4 - 5 km². This determines the estimated defence area required by a brigade in the case of dense defence.

Should it be impossible to use these standards, for example, in the flanks or in areas without roads, a special case of "sparse defence" was defined. In addition, "forest area defence" was distinguished as a separate category.

This was almost exactly the same defence system as employed in the defence against the general offensive of the summer of 1944. The requirements to increase the depth of deployment were new but did not represent any decisive change towards "defence in depth" or "territorial defence".

The *Field Manual* of 1954 and the *Infantry Battle Manual* of 1955 followed the principles of the *Officers' Manual* as described above and thus continued the practice based on the experience gained during the final stages of the war. What was new was the emphasis on the importance of terrain when deciding the defence position and the main line of defence. Guerilla fighting was also presented as important and guerilla warfare was given a chapter of its own.

In that the development of tactics was still limited in the 1950s by the constraints of wartime equipment, there was some logic in applying the fighting methods of those times. Plenty of information was flowing in on foreign developments, mainly on the Korean War and the atomic bomb, but it was difficult to distinguish fact from propaganda and to draw relevant conclusions in respect of tactics.

2.9 *Assessment of the reconstruction of the Defence Forces*

The post-war reconstruction of the Defence Forces took approximately a decade to complete. The most important decisions were the Conscription Act of 1950 and the ratification of the new organization in 1952. In addition to these legislative acts, several changes in training were made, mainly based on war experiences.

Defence policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s was described even in official connections as shameful. In view of the feelings and meagre budgetary appropriations of the time the epithet seems justified. However, this does not take the situation on the Continent and the changed position of Finland sufficiently into consideration. The strength and preparedness of the Defence Forces at that time is easily compared with that of its extremely high wartime level. It is often forgotten that armed forces were being drastically reduced all over Europe after the war and that Finland was not located along the main axis of tension. Finland still had the material and personnel resources at the beginning of the 1950s to form an army of more than 15 divisions, although this could not be accomplished very rapidly due to the lack of mobilization preparedness. Much of the equipment, e.g. means of communication, was also lacking, but there were enough arms. NATO had more than ten divisions at combat-readiness in Europe, and the Soviet Union perhaps 60.

Taking into consideration the rearmament, which had accelerated in Europe after the start of the Korean War, the relative defence capability of Finland was rapidly deteriorating, which gave Paasikivi good grounds for worrying.

The reconstruction of the Defence Forces at the beginning of the 1950s nevertheless created a solid basis for later developments. The defence system was generally deemed to be working well and there was no need to change its principles. The weaknesses were mainly in the quantity and quality of the equipment.

The Defence Revision Committee was instrumental in the successful development of the defence organization and doctrine. It managed to reconcile the views of the military command with the political pressures projected by the political parties. During the critical period at the end of the 1940s, the two successive Ministers of Defence, Yrjö Kallinen and Emil Skog, had great influence in that the Social Democrats quietly but decisively adopted a supportive attitude towards the Defence Forces, which was further strengthened during the 1950s.

Government circles finally decided, in 1954, that an improvement in the operational capability of the Defence Forces required rapid measures. The following year's budget granted the first real appropriation for military armaments. At the same time the facility for quick and efficient employment of reserves

in wartime troops was created. A gradual improvement of mobilization preparedness to its high pre-war level was also underway.

The effects of the new global strategy on the Nordic area and at the same time on Finland's position were discussed on many occasions during the early 1950s. Finland, just as many other nations, did not, however, have adequate technical means to prevent strategic bombers from using its airspace.

3 NEUTRALITY POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENCE

3.1 *Neutral countries between the blocs*

Stalin's death in 1953 is generally held to mark the beginning of a thaw in international relations. In the years that followed, rather wide zone of neutral countries was created between the military alliances in Europe.

The positive attitude that the Soviet Union adopted towards neutrality was not, however, a consequence of Stalin's death; there had also been earlier signs of change. The Soviet Union was not strong enough to keep her outer sphere of influence under control and the counteractions begun by the West in the late 1940s threatened to roll the Cold War frontier eastward.

As late as the establishment of NATO in 1949, the Soviet Union still opposed the idea of a bloc of neutral Nordic countries. Two years later, however, it began to advocate the re-establishment of neutrality in all the Nordic countries.³⁷ At the same time the Soviet desire for a neutral zone in Central Europe, including Germany and Austria, was expressed. This was later only realized in Austria.

The forming of blocs at the end of the 1940s and the emergence of neutral zones in the mid-1950s was greatly to influence the future of Finnish foreign policy and thereby her defence doctrine.

The fact that Finland remained outside the Warsaw Pact underlined her special position among the neighbours of the Soviet Union. It was true that Finland, along with 22 other states, was invited to the security conference in Moscow in November 1954. Finland announced, however, that she would not participate unless all the others who were invited also attended. The states that did in fact participate in the Moscow conference met again the following spring in Warsaw to conclude a defence alliance. And to this conference Finland was not invited.³⁸

The *Austrian State Treaty* of 15 May 1955 was seen in Finland

as a precedent for the concrete acceptance of neutrality. While recognizing Austria's independence, the terms of the treaty nevertheless imposed a number of economic obligations and some restrictions on the arming of troops and on political co-operation with Germany. The ban on general conscription and restrictions on troop strengths which had appeared in the original drafts did not appear in the final document, however. On 26 October 1955, after the occupation forces had left, the Austrian Parliament declared the permanent neutrality of the country.

The easing of political tensions and Soviet efforts to reduce her troops abroad were reflected in the return of the Porkkala naval base to Finland in accordance with the agreement concluded in Moscow on 19 September 1955.³⁹ On the same occasion the FCMA Treaty was extended by 20 years. The Soviet troops left Porkkala on 26 January 1956, after which Finland's prospects of carrying out a policy of neutrality were decidedly improved. It was also during this period that Finland joined the Nordic Council and was accepted as a member of the United Nations.

3.2 *Accelerating discussions on the national defence*

The increasing threat of nuclear weapons helped to accelerate the discussions in Finland around the mid-1950s on the development of a "total national defence". The Second World War was already being spoken of as a total war and there was reason to believe that, with the development of ever newer and more powerful weapons, future wars would be the kind to affect whole nations.

Articles appearing in the *Military Journal* show how the nuclear weapons issue was also becoming a central topic of discussion among the Finnish military, beginning about 1953 - 1955. Foreign developments and discussions on nuclear weapons were closely followed and their effects on tactics and the nature of war were assessed.

An article entitled "Our defence preparedness is moving into the spotlight" (1954), written by the esteemed wartime planner of operations at General Headquarters, Colonel V.K. Nihtilä is particularly indicative of the positive change in the

Finnish attitude towards the development of a total national defence. Nihtilä quoted the examples of Switzerland and Sweden, which maintained strong defences to safeguard their neutrality. He pointed out the possibility of a race on Finnish territory as a consequence of the application of the FCMA Treaty. He concluded that there was a need to promote defence willingness, to modernize defence planning in general and to change battle doctrine into one favouring decentralized fighting. Furthermore, civil defence should be made more efficient and there should be readiness for a long period of economic defence.

Nihtilä's view that the FCMA Treaty should be backed up by a strong defence capability was by no means unique. Colonel Wolf Halsti, for example, had on different occasions given careful consideration to the obligations of the Treaty and considered them decisive for defence planning. Official viewpoints were not publicized in the 1950s, but archival material and Paasikivi's diaries, published in the 1980s, show how important an issue the military obligations of the FCMA Treaty was for those responsible for security policy.

3.3 *Organization of a total national defence*

The most urgent task in getting the plans for the total national defence underway was the establishment of *defence council*, but no decision had been made. The Report of the Defence Revision Committee in 1949 had indeed proposed a defence council similar to the Government Committee of Ministers, in which experts other than ministers would have the right to participate but no voting right. This proposal was opposed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, who proposed instead that the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and the Chief of the General Staff should be made voting members of the council. During the years of delay, the Ministry of Defence and the Government held fast to the idea that the defence council should be a political body responsible for directing the total national defence and not merely a planning committee concentrating on military issues.

A compromise was eventually reached. A decree issued by the Government on 21 March 1957 appointed the Prime Minister,

Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance and Minister of Trade and Industry, along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and the Chief of the General Staff as permanent members of the new Defence Council. The Council was to be the highest advisory and planning body and to advise the President on matters concerning the national defence. The responsibilities were defined as observing the military-political situation, directing defence planning, co-ordinating the various fields of defence, preparing budgets and making other development proposals related to the defence of the country.

The development of the national defence legislation was initiated with the *Civil Defence Act* (1958), which took into consideration both the experiences of total war (the Second World War) and the demands of slowly developing crises. A project for the construction of bomb shelters was begun and shelters were eventually available for nearly half of the Finnish population. Later on, the weakness of the Act was recognized, in calling for the construction of shelters in designated urban municipalities while most of the rural population was left without protection. As the serious threat of long-range fall-out from nuclear weapons was already known,⁴⁰ it seems strange in retrospect that the danger of radiation was not taken more seriously in the Civil Defence Act. It is even more surprising that, in spite of criticism, the mistake remained unamended.

In the latter half of the 1950s preparations were begun for *economic defence* with creation of a permanent organization of economic defence. In the early 1960s the *Scientific Committee for National Defence*, the *Planning Board for Psychological Defence* and *Advisory Boards for Communications and Medical Services* were established.

A decision was reached on the proposal by the Defence Council to organize state-wide *national defence courses* at the War College and local courses in the provinces. The instruction in national defence had a great influence on the development of defence doctrine, primarily by making it public, since otherwise an overview could not have been gained even by persons directly involved in the planning.

3.4 *The depth of defence stressed in the new Field Manual*

Military defence planning and training obtained a new foundation based on modern concepts of war and of total national defence in the *General Part of the Field Manual* which appeared in 1958. Here it was stipulated that the total national defence should comprise political, administrative, military, psychological, economic and civil defence tasks. The *responsibilities of the Defence Forces* were specified as follows:

- to safeguard the country's territorial integrity and its neutrality;
- to mobilize and deploy the Defence Forces and to protect these functions;
- to carry out military operations.

The Defence Forces might further participate in maintaining public order and security to the extent determined by the Government, and might be assigned civil defence and other tasks necessary for the country.

The Field Manual specifies the *Army formations* as the army, army corps, division and brigade, the two latter being the basic formations. In accordance with the principle of territorial defence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was to have the authority to divide the country into national defence areas, comprising one or more military areas. The duties of the Commander of a national defence area were generally to include all military preparations except those delegated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, plus the command of mobilization, concentration of troops and safeguarding of neutrality. In the event of a break in communications he would be responsible for independently initiating defensive operations in his area. The division into defence areas would also form a basis for the areas of responsibility during wartime.

Several stages or situations were distinguished in preparing the country for war: peacetime, threat of war, safeguarding of neutrality and war.

The basis for planning the operations for the various situations was defined as follows: – “The basic strategic plan shall generally be drawn up for a case in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons seems probable. If necessary, the strategy and

tactics shall be adapted to the requirements of a general nuclear war."

Strategic defence zones were specified over an extended area. The troops under the Commander-in-Chief were assigned operation zones, within the boundaries of which they should carry out the tasks commanded. These would involve offensive, defensive or delaying action. One or more defence zones were to be chosen in an operation zone, thus to obtain flexibility for the defence.

In the implementation of the strategic defence, the following stages were distinguished according to time and place:

- covering operations,
- concentration of main forces,
- stabilization of the situation,
- operations on the main axis,
- operations in other areas of the front.

The importance of offensive action and guerilla fighting was stressed in all military operations (including defence). At an opportune time a strategic offensive should be undertaken in order to defeat the enemy. This would require establishing superiority at least locally. In a disadvantageous situation preparations should be made for either retreat operations or guerilla warfare.

The general part of the *Field Manual* outlined both the strategic doctrine and operational – tactical doctrine, but the principles were not very binding or specific. A clear recommendation of the principle of implementing military operations in an extended area ("in depth") was evident nevertheless. The geographical location of the defence positions or areas was not defined, but it was later made clear that combat should be entered immediately on the frontiers, although at first with less strength.

The *Field Manual Part I* of 1963 provided fairly detailed instructions for the operations and battles of the formations. Here the formations were defined as the army and the brigade; the division had been dropped out. The general principles of strategic defence were not dealt with in this Manual. Quoting the introduction to the Manual: "The use of nuclear explosives and other combat agents by the enemy has been taken into consideration in our planning, and procedures have been

designed accordingly, adapted to the conditions of our country". The discussion of the use of nuclear weapons and the countermeasures to be taken was limited, however, and it could not be said that the Manual put particular emphasis on nuclear weapons. The main emphasis was rather on *repelling a general offensive deep in the defence area* (on two lines) and on active counter-operations to defeat the enemy. Manoeuvres and deployment areas were precisely specified, often mentioning even map scales.

As a whole, the 1963 Field Manual Part I can be considered to provide a clear framework for the further development of tactics. The operational principles described required training and equipment of high standard. It was questioned whether these requirements could be met without a major procurement programme and an increase in personnel training. The Manual represented a last effort to adapt the operational – tactical experiences and combat methods of the Second World War to the requirements of the nuclear age and the overall development of military technology. The contradiction between the needs of the time and the lack of resources manifested in the old operational – tactical doctrines began to be apparent.

3.5 *Development of the Defence Forces in the 1960s*

About 1960, in the face of the military build-up in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Berlin crisis precipitated by the Soviet Union and the otherwise changing military situation, the leadership of the Defence Forces took steps to eliminate the deficiencies in material. There was also an attempt to demonstrate the role of the Defence Forces in support of the neutrality policy.

Replacing of the worn-out equipment of the Air Force began in the mid-1950s, when Finland acquired a few jet trainers and interceptors. The air control radar system was also expanded to cover the entire country, and basic acquisitions made possible the domestic manufacture of new anti-tank weapons (light and heavy recoilless guns).⁴¹

The trade credit granted by the Soviet Union during the period 1959 – 1962 allowed modernizing of artillery and armoured equipment to begin and important purchases of

interceptors and naval equipment. The crisis in the autumn of 1961 essentially boosted the appropriations. The acquisition of MiG-21 fighters in 1962, following several stages of negotiation, was particularly important. On the other hand, the procurement of anti-aircraft missiles was delayed out of foreign policy and budgetary considerations, although the need for them was acknowledged.⁴²

Since the procurements were of significance to foreign policy, the following principles were observed:

- The acquired material should be suitable to Finnish conditions and to the strategy and tactics to be employed.
- Finland should have the capacity to maintain and service the equipment, at least at the basic level.
- Training of personnel for the operation and service of the equipment purchased from the Soviet Union should take place in the Soviet Union.
- Besides the equipment, a substantial amount of ammunition should be acquired, and usually also the spare parts and general supplies required for long-term use and maintenance and in possible wartime.⁴³

The development programme required by the changing concept of war and the new emphasis on neutrality was completed at the General Headquarters in 1962 and released as a document entitled *The Development of the Defence Establishment in the 1960s* (also known as the K programme).⁴⁴ The document began with a fairly extensive discussion of doctrinal principles, which the following comments and quotes may illustrate.

In the assessment the nature of warfare, the evolution of doctrine (towards flexible response) in the United States received special emphasis:

The continuing nuclear build-up by the Great Powers and the development of more powerful explosives is leading to a situation where total destruction is an increasingly probable end result of nuclear war. This probability constitutes a very strong deterrent to the outbreak of nuclear war, which in turn increases the importance of deploying conventional arms and the possibility of small nations to defend themselves.

Airspace was considered to be the most vulnerable sector in the military-political position of Finland, but the danger of radioactive fall-out was also recognized:

...it seems probable that, with the outbreak of general war, our airspace by the Arctic Ocean would be the target of violations. Moreover, a nuclear attack on areas bordering our country could result in radioactive fall-out over Finland, or even actual destruction by stray guided missiles.

The military-political position of Finland in Northern Europe thus puts her at the mercy of the air and naval strategy of others. Nearby air and sea operations could turn Northern Finland into a battle ground even at the outbreak of war. In the latter stages of war, extensive land, air and naval operations might be carried out in our territory.

Preparations for the prevention of war, neutrality and long-term crisis were urged as follows:

- The primary goal in the development of our National Defence is to prevent in advance the planning and implementation of military operations against Finland and to prevent trespass on Finnish territory.
- The possibility of getting involved in war should nevertheless be taken seriously.
- During the threat of war or actual war, our country is in danger of becoming isolated, which would also greatly affect the plans for the civilian sector of the National Defence.

The following goals were set for the National Defence:

- A capability to repel violations against the Finnish neutrality by land, sea and air as well as to prevent aggression through Finnish territory or airspace.
- A constant capability to deter unexpected efforts to break the Finnish will and the capability to defend the country.

- A capability to put all the resources of the country on war footing in case of a strategic general attack.
- A capability to withstand air attacks, including nuclear attacks and the indirect effects of nuclear explosions close to our frontiers.
- A capability to secure the economic subsistence of the entire nation, even when isolated.

These goals, while extremely challenging, were not more so than those suggested for Sweden and Switzerland.

The financing of the 'K programme' was to take seven years, and the defence expenditures were to comprise 3% of the Gross National Product, i.e. approximately the same percentage as in Switzerland. Sweden was at this time spending under 5% of the Gross National Product on defence, the Federal Republic of Germany 5.5% and England 8%. Relative to what other countries were doing, the programme could not then be regarded as utopian. The political implementation nevertheless proved difficult.

The 'K programme' and its justifications corresponded rather well with the realistic requirements of the military-political situation in the early 1960s. It would have required a substantial increase in the defence budget for the whole decade, however, and political leaders did not readily consent.

The Government prohibited the distribution of the pamphlet describing the programme, published by the General Headquarters, but the Defence Council approved the 'K programme' in March 1964 after many behind the scenes debates. However, the basic procurement bill under preparation for 1966 – 1971 was not passed. By way of compensation, the Defence Establishment was granted certain rights to place orders, beginning in 1965, for several years to come.

3.6 *Crisis management and neutrality policy*

The birth of the 'K programme' was closely associated with the *Berlin crisis* and the so-called *Note Crisis* of 1961. The experiences gained by the leadership of the Defence Forces at this time served the later development of crisis management principles.

This period also saw Finland's neutrality policy put into action for the first time.

In the Finnish interpretation, the main events in the dramatic summer and autumn of 1961 were as follows:

- Premier Khrushchev announced at the beginning of June that the Soviet Union would enter into a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic by the end of 1961, at which time West Berlin was to become a free city. The West protested against this.
- The Soviet Union announced on 21 June the possible start to a series of nuclear tests and of an increase in the armed forces (evidenced by an increase of approximately 30% in defence expenditures and giving up of the planned army personnel cuts).
- The Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshall Rodion Malinovsky visited Finland between 23 June and 2 July.
- President Kennedy announced on 25 July countermeasures to be taken by the United States (increase in defence appropriations, call-up of reserves).
- The Berlin Wall was erected on 13 August.
- A Note regarding the access to Berlin was sent to the Western Powers by the Soviet Union on 23 August.
- On 29 August the Soviets announced a delay in conscript demobilization and on 30 August the start to nuclear testing on 1 September.
- An increase in radiation levels was confirmed in Finland in September.
- There were signs of a Soviet withdrawal from the confrontation in Berlin during 12 - 23 September. Khrushchev announced that the signing of the peace treaty with the GDR might be delayed until 1962.
- President Leonid Brezhnev visited Finland 22 - 30 September.

A memorandum was written at the General Headquarters to the Defence Council during the summer in response to the strained situation in Berlin, and presented at the Defence Council Meeting on 11 August by Lieutenant General Viljanen. The memorandum proposed several measures, including:

- A study in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military authorities into the implications should

- enforcement of the FCMA Treaty come into question;
- Strengthening of territorial surveillance by land, sea and air;
 - A study into the possibility of rapidly improving the effectiveness of the air defence;
 - Improvements to the efficiency of civil defence and, in particular, radiation detection;
 - Proposals for the use of the rest of the trade credit granted by the Soviet Union;
 - Increase in emergency supplies.⁴⁵

The Defence Council agreed to appoint the proposed task force to study the measures, but the first meeting of this task force was delayed until 30 October. According to Max Jakobson, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, communications between his ministry and the command of the Defence Forces had been poor, but co-operation improved as the crisis escalated.⁴⁶

The Defence Council met several times during the autumn and was kept posted on the situation. The need to increase defence capability was acknowledged, but initially there was reluctance to grant the additional appropriations. The Berlin crisis seemed to be calming down and the President travelled to the United States to report on Finland's neutrality policy.

Nuclear testing was also part of the power struggle between East and West. Khrushchev boasted that the Soviets possessed 100-megaton bombs and, to prove it, a series of test explosions were carried out, topped with an explosion of approximately 60 megatons on 30 October on the island of Novaya Zemlya.

On the same day Finland received a long and acrimonious note from Moscow accusing particularly the West Germans of stepping up their military activities in the North and finally proposing military consultations between Finland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the FCMA Treaty.⁴⁷

The absence of the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, still on their visit to the United States, played its part in increasing the confusion in Helsinki. For example, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces was not immediately informed of the note by the Government, nor were any instructions given for action.

Soon after the arrival of the note, the Commander-in-Chief

of the Defence Forces, General Simelius, convened a meeting of the commanders of the national defence areas. Simelius presented the view that Finland's capability and will to defend the country needed to be demonstrated in her military preparedness. He continued: "In the current situation this especially concerns our neutrality and safeguarding the integrity of our airspace and our maritime and land frontiers.... Legislation should be put in the place to ensure that prompt decisions can be made in crisis situations.... We should be able to protect our civilian population and our vital institutions, so that our society and defence capability do not become paralyzed when the events surprise us."⁴⁸

On 13 November President Kekkonen received an extensive memorandum from General Simelius: "Viewpoints on the Soviet Note". It stated that the Defence Forces had stepped up preparedness within the limits of the Peace Treaty, but the lack of war material was a problem. Enhancing the effectiveness of the air defence was now paramount. Immediate procurements from the Soviet Union could have a positive effect. A more flexible interpretation of the Peace Treaty would be required, and the legislation on defence preparedness should be speeded up. Plans had already been made for consultations with the Soviet Union. Simelius emphasized the need for improved co-operation between military and civilian leaders. The President responded to Simelius that in his opinion the consultation proposal could be averted by cautious political moves.⁴⁹

A further note arrived from Moscow on 16 November urging consultations. President Kekkonen had just dissolved Parliament and ordered new elections. He travelled to Novosibirsk for the negotiations on 22 November, and on the fourth day a communiqué was sent from Novosibirsk announcing that the Soviet Union had agreed to postpone the request for consultations.

Negotiations were held at the President's residence on 14 December with the main item on the agenda the use of a trade credit granted by the Soviet Union. Kekkonen announced at the same time (according to Simelius) that in his opinion Finland would not be defending the country alone. This surprised the Commander-in-Chief, who could not fully comprehend the President's real meaning.⁵⁰

presented by the Note Crisis of 1961 ceased to exist. In addition, the nuclear doctrines of the superpowers, backed up by intercontinental missile systems, seemed to be functioning as deterrents to nuclear attack. The strategic importance of the in-between areas was therefore decreased. This was clearly pointed out by Risto Hyvärinen at a meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1965:

1. The threat of a general war has decisively diminished despite the increase in international tension from time to time.
2. Because of the risk of escalation into general war, limited wars in Europe have become most unlikely.
3. Finland has lost its strategic importance as far as the Great Powers are concerned.... Leningrad can now be destroyed without the use of Finnish territory and the territory of Finland is no longer of vital importance to the defence of the city.⁶⁰

4 TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AS THE BASIS FOR DOCTRINE

The need to expand defence operations into a territorial defence covering the entire country had been recognized soon after the war, and in the reconstruction of 1952 an appropriate command organization was adopted. It was not then considered desirable to carry the territorial principle into tactics, however. Battles were instead to be fought in a more linear defence formation, including counterattacks.

Gradually the territorial requirement was extended to include combat operations, as growing difficulties in initiating attacks and defending the rear became apparent. Several studies were undertaken at the beginning of the 1960s with the aim of developing territorial defence. First it was necessary to set the relationship between the units and the territorial organization on a more solid foundation. Some new decentralized combat methods were tested, in territorial guerilla fighting in particular.

4.1 Reorganization of the military areas in 1966

The Commander-in-Chief, General Simelius, approved in 1963 the principle whereby the command of the earlier divisions and military areas and their duties would be incorporated into seven new military areas, following the boundaries of the provincial civil administration. The plan aroused opposition mainly among the inspectors of the service branches of the forces, as it would mean the decentralization of administrative responsibilities from the General Headquarters to the military areas. Work on the plan and the disputes continued for another two years.⁶¹

The decree to divide the country into military areas became effective on 1 July 1966. The divisional staff headquarters were dissolved (along with the commands of the national defence areas). The military districts retained approximately the same position and boundaries, but the new military areas were assigned both the responsibilities of the former area (mobilization) organization and the command of the Army. With some few exceptions, all military preparations for national defence became

the responsibility of the commanders of the military areas. The Air Force and the Navy, however, remained independent and directly under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.⁶²

Introduction of the military areas placed the responsibilities for defence preparations within new geographical boundaries everywhere except in Northern Finland and Ostrobothnia. The change was most marked in Southern Finland, where a new military area accounting for a third of the entire resources of the country was formed.

4.2 Criticism of defence intensifies

Almost all social institutions had become targets of criticism by the late 1960s. The disillusionment was closely tied to ideological developments in Europe as a whole, which in turn were related to the military – political détente prevailing in Europe prior to 1968. In Finland, critique on the Defence Establishment, by students in particular, continued on the basis of social and domestic policies long after Europe's "mad year".

Internal criticism within the Defence Forces was mostly directed towards tactics, which were thought to be both too rigid in the face of the changing nature of war and unnecessarily offensive in view of the available resources.

The defence debate in the late 1960s revolved mainly around doctrine. The major reason for the crisis in credibility was the development of nuclear armaments, which had assumed such quantitative and qualitative dimensions that no doubt could remain about the destructiveness of a possible nuclear war. There was also a substantial increase in conventional troops, although Northern Europe, in the opinion of many, remained a "safe haven".

There was also uncertainty over the position and functions of the Defence Forces with regard to foreign policy, as was especially evident in the debate over defence in the late 1960s. This was partly due to disagreement over defence appropriations, but another important reason was that the wartime functions of the Defence Forces had not been made public. High-ranking political and military leaders often resorted to equivocal language,

thereby sparking strong criticism.

It later became apparent that even the President had begun to worry about the ambiguity surrounding the duties of the Defence Forces, but he retained his right to interpret them as he wished.⁶³ The Defence Council had in fact already in 1962 adopted guidelines for the war-time functions of the Defence Forces. However, only the preparatory functions during peacetime were made public in the National Defence Statute of 1960.

The peacetime functions of the Defence Forces were:

1. To promote the defence preparedness of the nation by administering military training and by promoting activities that improve physical condition and increase the citizen's will to defend his country;
2. To prepare for the defence of the country and to protect its neutrality in other ways;
3. To defend the legal social order; and
4. To participate in the maintenance of public order and safety as prescribed by law.

The Defence Council had also defined (secretly) in 1962 the duties to safeguard neutrality by territorial surveillance and to repel territorial violations. The actual wartime functions of the Defence Forces were: "...to defend the country and to prevent any offensive operations through its territory, thus maintaining the freedom to act and to assure the economic subsistence of the people."

In the winter of 1966 - 1967 the Defence Council approved a document *Maanpuolustuksemme tienviitat* (Guidelines for the National Defence), which was published on 26 June 1967. This short (12 page) report can be considered the first official declaration of Finland's defence doctrine.

The report defined the objectives of defence capability as follows:

Our country is in danger of being drawn into conflict if general war breaks out elsewhere in Europe or if one of the Great Powers resorts to a surprise attack to improve its strategic position when war appears inevitable. Should such a surprise attack fail, however, the consequence might be a prolonged and escalating war. Anticipating this possibility, and all the political complications

and military sacrifices, a state might instead abandon its possible plans of attack. Thus by being prepared to repel a surprise attack as well as being ready for a prolonged war, we will develop the proper kind of defence capability against all conceivable alternatives and diminish in advance the danger of becoming the object of aggression.

This doctrine was clearly aimed at preventing the outbreak of war and included features similar to the Swiss "dissuasion" doctrine intended to keep possible aggressors outside the country's borders and to the French relative deterrence by nuclear weapons. Critics of the report particularly complained about the vagueness.

The 'K programme' drafted at the beginning of the 1960s was no longer considered realistic after the change in the political situation, and in 1968 a revised 'PV programme' was drafted to replace it. This programme was not implemented either, although the level of defence costs was lowered from the three per cent of the Gross National Product, proposed for the 'K programme', to two per cent.

4.3 Territorial defence also as a battle doctrine

Several studies in the mid-1960s argued that the 1963 Field Manual and the organization of Army units it required was based on excessively rigid principles and concentrated primarily on strength of personnel. The requirements of the times rather called for greater preparedness to repel surprise attacks and flexibility to react to the rapid turns of battle. Thus the entire doctrine, which was based on a strong Army and partly also on preparation for fighting in conditions of nuclear war, was up for question.

A leaner organization and improved mobility and firepower were offered as solutions to enhance the fighting capability of the forces. However, this would still have left unresolved the defence of the rear and tying down of the enemy along its logistics tail. Neither would there have been sufficient troops available for fighting in one's own or the enemy's rear. The organization of a local defence system for the military districts

was proposed as a solution to this problem. A "rear battalion" with light arms should be deployed, since conventional combat battalions could not be afforded. During this period, solutions stressing guerilla fighting and guerilla warfare were also intensively studied.

At the end of the 1960s, a new *General Part of the Field Manual* was drafted to comply with the new division into military areas and the emergence of new combat principles that the local defence by military districts made possible. The aim of strategic defence was defined as "repelling the enemy attack by conventional operations with the possibility of resorting to guerilla warfare". The earlier concepts of combat zone, theatre of war and home base, were abandoned. The military areas assumed particular importance in the territorial defence system. The combat troops were divided into general operational troops and the local troops supporting them, mainly by guerilla fighting and covering the rear. Units not participating in combat were referred to as support troops.

The structure of territorial defence was illustrated by a drawing (figure 2) showing how the local defence forms a cushioning under-structure. The fast deployment forces first use delaying tactics to slow down and exhaust the enemy. Then, as the enemy is repelled, general (or main) forces start their offensive in order to bring about a decision.

The *General Part of the Field Manual* 1973 was approved in November 1972, when the principles of territorial defence were established. The functions of the Defence Forces were also established as part of the broader security policy, and the various civil defence principles were defined. The revision of the doctrine did not bring any significantly new features to the operations of the Air Force, Navy or to the fighting of basic formations. The new activities of the military areas and districts required a fair amount of planning and training, however. The role of local defence was if anything overemphasized in the Manual, and methods were specified without sufficient attention to local needs. Among the general public, territorial defence was easily confused with local defence or even guerilla warfare, even though there was certainly no aim to abandon conventional delaying, defensive or offensive operations.

The development of tactics and training suffered for many

years due to the delay in revising the Field Manual of 1963; temporary training instructions had to be resorted to. The *Battle Manual for Basic Formations* 1977 crystallized the principles of brigade fighting and described the manner of co-operation with local troops.

Compared with the Manual of 1963, a notable change in the 1977 Manual was the abandonment of the rear defensive position of a brigade, for which there would not have been sufficient troops. The rear headquarters were also abandoned and the responsibility was given to local troops. The depth of defence now constituted essentially a single level, the brigade defence position, where 2–3 battalions could be echeloned. The principles of defence for brigades were also sharpened compared with earlier ones, and the operations of the different arms were concentrated in a smaller area, due to the diminished probability of the use of nuclear weapons.

The principles of the 1977 Battle Manual were retained in broad outline in the revised *Brigade Battle Manual* 1984. The role of the brigade as a tactical fighting formation was further emphasized in the 1980s, while at the same time combat support and other tasks required by the operations were mainly transferred to the army corps, military districts and military areas.

The Finnish *territorial defence doctrine* of the 1970s and 1980s was briefly as follows:

- Independent operations by seven military areas supported by the Air Force and the Navy provided the foundation.
- Based on 23 – 27 military districts, the entire country was covered by a local defence and mobilization system with good combat preparedness.
- General forces (army corps and brigades) were to be used in decisive operations to stop an enemy offensive and repel the enemy by defensive, delaying and offensive operations.

The army corps was a flexibly composed (15,000 – 30,000 men) operational formation. Under its command were brigades, which were tactical formations comprising approximately 7,000 men each (3 – 5 infantry battalions).

A *territorial battle operation* could be divided into three stages:

- Covering operations (securing mobilization and concentration of troops)
- Stabilization of the situation (slowing down the enemy)
- Decisive battles (defeating the enemy by a counterattack).

Territorial fighting was not conceived of in terms of rigid formulas. The defence of the country could be carried out in different ways, depending on the situation and circumstances. In Lapland it was possible to be flexible and let the enemy advance quite far, whereas rigid defence operations would be needed on the southern coast. Defence of the archipelago and Åland would require quite different tactics.

Brigade operations also took on features of territorial defence at the beginning of the 1970s. A defence area was assigned to each battalion, including sites to be held in all circumstances. The orders gave the commander considerable freedom to choose the method of fighting. Offensive action by brigades and battalions had an important role in the battle doctrine, since passive defence could not be successful under Finnish conditions.

4.4 *Parliamentary defence committees*

The increasing debate over defence in the 1960s and the difficulties encountered in funding prompted a thorough study of the role of the Defence Forces in security policy, with recommendations for their development. The first *Parliamentary Defence Committee* reviewed in 1970 – 1971 some of the basic issues, which had been proposed during the lively debate of previous years. These included the goals and methods of security policy, the structure of the defence system and the functions of the Defence Forces.⁶⁴

The Committee approved the principles developed in the 1960s by the Defence Forces, which, however, more or less reflected the established organization. The task of this first Committee was thus to review the foundation of the plans and to define the requirements. Its Report clarified the upper (strategy) level of the defence doctrine and created a framework for the development of the lower (operational – tactical) level. The Defence Committee Report carried considerably more weight

- deteriorating international situation
- threat of war between foreign powers
- war between foreign powers
- armed attack against Finland.

Four main categories of exceptional circumstances in the list were taken as the basis for planning: major accident, economic crisis, threat of war and armed attack against Finland.

An *armed attack against Finland* was considered the most concrete threat, but it was noted that this would probably relate to a conflict between foreign powers:

The aim (of the aggressor) may be to seize transit routes in order to reach targets located outside Finnish borders, to utilize our territory to gain depth for a defence, or to occupy Finland.

The *Parliamentary Emergency Legislation Committee* which sat from 1977 to 1979 examined the possibilities for improving the legal basis for action in exceptional circumstances. The Committee Report, handed down in 1981, was criticized, among other things, because the authority to be given to the Government in exceptional circumstances was too broad. Emergency legislation was not drawn up directly on the basis of the report, but instead several partial decisions were made for the preparedness planning in different areas.

The use of military force during a threat of war was presented in the Report of the Third Defence Committee in a new way:⁶⁹

Finland must be able to regulate her defence preparedness flexibly and with as little inconvenience as possible, in accordance with the requirements of the threat at any given time. Finland will have to be able to intensify border patrolling and territorial surveillance in order to extend surveillance coverage to exposed areas. Finland must be able to concentrate sufficient forces in these areas to prevent the exploitation of her territory and to deter an attack against the country.

Priority was given by the Committee to the development of a new type of *fast deployment forces*:⁷⁰

The fast deployment forces must be developed in such a way that, during conflict between foreign countries, they will be able to

demonstrate our ability to protect Finland's territorial integrity, at least in key areas. Such a tense situation between the great powers and the resultant military threat to Finland may prove to be of long duration.... The capability of the fast deployment forces should be improved to such an extent that their maximum strength could be limited to 250,000 men. The most important part of these forces consists of Air Force and Navy combat units and mobile Army units, capable of being concentrated in exposed areas.

The fast deployment forces were to be formed by using the peacetime armed forces as a base. They could be readily and flexibly supplemented by the reserves. The cadre-based fast deployment forces, expanded to combat strength, could then be transferred to a threatened area.

The feasibility and wisdom of maintaining large reserves has always been a subject for discussion. The Committee saw a need to supply the troops with new equipment and made the following comments concerning the main reserves:⁷¹

The number of available reserves will diminish, with the smaller size of age groups, to some 600,000 men in the 1990s. In the Committee's view, arrangements should be made to enable the use of these reserves in a situation where the fast deployment forces are not sufficient for deterring and repelling an attack. If needed, large reserves will give Finland's defence depth and durability as well as protection to cope with unforeseen developments. Equipment for reserves not included in the fast deployment forces can, however, be improved only on a very limited scale. The tasks of these reserves will have to be defined accordingly.

Preparedness was to be maintained at all times and in as flexible a manner as possible. The question of funding, however, was not settled at this point, as the Parliamentary Defence Commission noted in its report in 1986.

Preparedness for exceptional circumstances was clarified when the Government approved the Defence Council Memorandum "Principles of preparing for exceptional circumstances" in November 1982. As a main principle all authorities were to carry on their responsibilities in exceptional circumstances and be responsible for relevant preparations. Large organizational and

personnel changes in the event of a crisis would hence be unnecessary. The Government's statement continued earlier efforts to abandon the wartime practices of the 1940s, when the Defence Forces had been responsible for many civilian activities, such as rail transportation.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Jaakko Valtanen, stated his views on the *role of the Defence Forces in crisis situations* at the Paasikivi Society in January 1984. His speech came after a heated discussion on the threat of nuclear weapons to Finland, particularly the new Euromissiles. General Valtanen's key question was whether Finland had the means to influence crisis management and if the Defence Forces had any part in it.

Elaborating on the role of the Defence Forces General Valtanen set the following goal: "We shall not tolerate our territory being exploited for launching an attack or for any other purposes of war. Should we be unable to control our territory in a crisis situation, we would lose the advantages and position gained through decades of successful foreign policy". Therefore Finland should strive for "the greatest possible defensive and preventive capability".

According to Valtanen, the fear of nuclear war had resulted in a situation, where "in a protracted crisis and conflict situation the armed forces are rather tools for crisis adjustment and management than actual instruments of war.... The position and the tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces also can be assessed from the standpoint of crisis management."

Crisis management therefore means that "...we aim to prevent, in advance, situations where our external security would be threatened. We aim to prevent at all costs our country's involvement in war." In practice, this requires a functioning decision-making system for defence policy, which in Finland is represented by the Government and the Defence Council. The requirements for the Defence Forces in crisis management were: following of the military situation, a permanent organization of experts, an efficient command organization, credible preparedness to demonstrate military strength combined with a flexible mobilization system, preparedness to defend strategically important targets and the capability for fast deployment of wartime defence forces.

These viewpoints on crisis management were received with

some confusion. On the one hand, criticism pointed out that the statements made in the lecture tended to compromise on the actual combat capability and to be satisfied with merely a war-prevention effort. On the other hand, attention was paid to the aim of employing management principles characteristic of Great Powers, such as the show of force, even in a small country, instead of giving priority to political measures to solve the crisis.

Responding to the criticism General Valtanen again emphasized four years later in his speech to the Paasikivi Society that measures taken for crisis management by the Finnish Defence Forces were aimed at both the prevention of war and to ascertain the success of defence, should Finland nevertheless become the object of aggression.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT

The following evolutionary trends can be traced in the Finnish defence doctrine at the strategic level:

1. The doctrine developed away from the *concept of total war* as experienced in the Second World War towards an emphasis on the *prevention of war and crisis management*. The arrangements for total national defence and exceptional circumstances were gradually brought closer to normal peacetime arrangements in order to avoid sudden changes of command and new organizational structures in crisis situations, and to clarify lines of responsibility.
2. The *principle of territorial defence* became more important, and with it the system of local defence was developed. The idea of a territorial defence organization was introduced as early as the beginning of the 1950s, but a lack of resources delayed its realization until the late 1960s. The battle doctrine for the Army slowly changed from the wartime concept of line and positional defence to comply with territorial defence.
3. The importance of *surveillance and repelling border violations* increased with the strengthening of the role of air and naval defence.
4. *Fast deployment forces* (peacetime cadre troops) were regarded as important in the 1940s and 1950s. There was an effort to improve the fighting capability of the *general forces* (creation of large reserves) in the following two decades, but the role of flexibly and easily recruitable fast deployment forces was once again emphasized in the doctrine of the 1980s.
5. The *defence of Northern Finland* was strengthened. Although the initial decisions in this direction were made in the mid-1950s, it was not until the 1960's that they were carried out. The goal in building the defence of Lapland around peacetime troops was to ensure a rapid recruitment of forces in a crisis situation, to prevent the use of Finnish territory for hostile purposes. Efforts to improve the defence of Lapland continued in the 1980s.

There were no sharp turning points in the evolution of the strategic doctrine. All the developments mentioned above

required at least a decade to become firmly established. The defence system has changed very little in principle. In the 1980s it continued to be relatively army-oriented and based on general conscription and a large trained reserve.

The main features of the organization of the Defence Forces in the mid-1980s are shown in figure 4.

Figure 5, showing the *evolution of the Army battle doctrine*, illustrates the transformation of positional and area defence into territorial defence during the 1970s; territorial defence was further developed in the 1980s to take into account the individual requirements of the various parts of the country. The potential targets on the South Coast are rigidly defended, whereas in the central and northern parts of the country there is more room for territorial flexibility. Strategic defence has always included operational and tactical counterattacks.

The role of *local defence* does not show up clearly in the drawing. The local defence system based on the military districts, which was created in the 1960s, reflected a somewhat similar kind of thinking as the decentralization of arms depots and the concealment of weapons in 1944: that is, lightly armed troops should be formed within the military districts. The aim in 1944 had been to rapidly establish a rifle battalion in each military district to safeguard the mobilization of the general forces, and to engage in guerilla fighting should the area fall into enemy hands. By the 1960s, the tasks of the local defence had become considerably more diversified and there was no longer a need to conceal weapons, but the importance of the military district was the same. The Finnish solution was by no means unique; local defence was in general strengthened in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Developments in Austria, which was in much the same position as Finland, were particularly similar.

The development of the *Air Defence doctrine* is reflected in the changes in equipment and organization. The need to protect the Army had led to the integration of the anti-aircraft defence into the Army as early as the late 1940s. During the following two decades air defence equipment increasingly lagged behind that of other countries, and it became impossible to guarantee even a satisfactory protection of population centres and fixed military targets. Fighter defence in the 1960s was primarily developed against territorial violations and as anti-aircraft

defence for the protection of combat troops. By the end of the 1970s the air defence had become somewhat better equipped for territorial protection against air-raids and landing attacks. The Air Force did not, however, get suitable equipment for ground attack or bombing operations. It was considered that proper role of the Air Force was to support the fighting of the Army and the Navy by concentrating on interception, i.e. in operations against enemy ground-attack planes.

The main tasks of the *Naval Defence* were to block the sealines to coastal targets and to defend Åland. Surveillance of the sea area and the defence against territorial violations also became important in the early 1960s. The Coast Artillery had already been incorporated into the Army in the 1940s and operated therefore in close co-operation with the troops defending the coast. The operational use of the Navy was not bound to specific waters but remained subordinated to the supreme command.

Two clear stages of change can be seen in the interrelationship between Finnish military doctrine and foreign policy in the years 1945 – 85.

First, the re-orientation of foreign policy in the 1940s, together with the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, encouraged the gradual adoption of a *territorial defence system*. At the same time, the restrictions of the Paris Peace Treaty and the role of the Defence Forces in maintaining internal order increased the importance of the fast deployment forces based on peacetime units. Territorial defence made it possible to prepare for the defence against an attack from several conceivable directions without needing to specify a particular direction in advance. It also facilitated rapid defensive action and independent operations even in the event of a break in communications. The principle of territorial defence was first employed only in the command organization, and even this was carried out in two stages: the 1950s saw the formation of the national defence areas (three divisions) and in the late 1960s these were replaced by seven military areas, which commanded all defence preparations and combat operations in their respective areas. The principle of territorial defence was not expanded to incorporate the actual fighting, i.e. tactics, until the 1970s. The strict interpretation of the military clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty and a fear of the repercussions on foreign policy had prevented any effective

preparations for mobilization until the end of the 1950s.

A second clear change contingent on the interrelationship between foreign policy and defence doctrine was the need in the face of an active neutrality policy to strengthen *territorial surveillance and the capability against territorial violations*. The crisis of autumn 1961 and its political resolution emphasized the importance of safeguarding neutrality and the role of the Air Force and the Navy in this. Experience was also gained in crisis management, although this was not a term used in Finland before the 1980s. The priority of foreign policy had been acknowledged before, but in the 1960s the Government wanted to clearly define security policy and the role of its various components. National defence was subsequently defined as an instrument of the Government in support of its foreign policy.

An evaluation of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the doctrine is difficult, since the real test, a serious military crisis or war, has fortunately evaded us. It is somewhat easier to draw conclusions as to the role of the defence doctrine in support of foreign policy.

The reconstruction of the Defence Forces in the early 1950s was earlier in this study seen to be for the most part solidly based and appropriate. However, international events, especially the introduction of nuclear weapons and the increase in the importance of the North, soon created the need to update the organization and equipment of the Defence Forces and revise the doctrine of National Defence.

The National Defence was cautiously, even secretly developed during the 1950s, as if measures taken toward organizing the defence of the country would be politically questionable. The reluctance in making the doctrine public also may suggest that it had not been thoroughly thought out. These quiet measures did, however, harvest good results.

The great effort that went into the development of tactics and training of the Defence Forces could do nothing to ease the lack of credibility surrounding the strategic doctrine. This became apparent in the autumn of 1961 during the Berlin crisis and Note Crisis. The efforts of political leaders and the military leadership to clarify the strategic doctrine and to strengthen its material foundation, especially in the Defence Council and in national defence courses, did gradually result in a rise in the level of

defence preparedness. Credibility still remained a problem, however. The build-up of nuclear and conventional weapons in the defence forces of the Great Powers and their military alliances seemed almost to nullify the prospects of a small country to defend itself.

The introduction of the territorial defence doctrine greatly improved the credibility of the country's defence in the 1970s. The main principles of the defence system were generally approved both by the political leaders and by the military command, although the details of the doctrine were not well known. The rather general unanimity of the parliamentary defence committees and the will of the Finnish people to defend the country, as shown in opinion polls, expressed approval of the doctrine.⁷²

The doctrine has supported peacetime policies well as is evident in the overall improvement in Finland's security position. Assessed in this way, the National Defence has served its purpose. As noted above, the doctrine has not been put to the test of the real crisis or war, and one can only surmise from the known facts how Finland might have fared in time of crisis.

With respect to the military forces capable of protecting her security Finland's defence preparedness had diminished to a critically low level in the 1950s. The reasons for taking the risks were related to both domestic and foreign policy. Meagre financial resources had also to be divided among many takers.

President Paasikivi was aware of the dangers implicit in a weak defence. One of his diaries contains a poignant quote from discussions with his Cabinet Ministers in October of 1951: "We have taken the risk of basing our policy on the assumption that there will be no war at this time. Only the future will tell whether this assumption was right or wrong. We have not increased the strength of our National Defence, it exists in an interim state."⁷³

There is not yet enough material available for a final assessment of whether the decisions made for the management of National Defence were appropriate and whether the risks that were taken, were fully justifiable. We only know from experience that the Finnish foreign policy brought results, the economic situation improved and the integration of the nation continued; and in that sense the risks had been worth taking. With the improvement in the country's economic and political situation

the National Defence was strengthened too. Military doctrine was moulded so as to support foreign policy in particular, but also to function in the event of the country requiring an armed defence.

NOTES

1. Pekka Visuri, *Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan. Puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys läntisessä Keski-Euroopassa ja Suomessa vuosina 1945 - 1985* (Keuruu: Otava, 1989). English summary: From total war to crisis management. The evolution of defence doctrines in Western Central Europe and Finland 1945 - 1985. Detailed references to this work are not given in the text.
2. For the theoretical framework, see Visuri (1989), pp. 11 - 43. On the term doctrine see also Wilhelm Agrell, *Alliansfrihet och atombomber. Kontinuitet och förändring i den svenska försvarsdoktrinen från 1945 till 1982* (Stockholm, 1985), pp. 19 - 24.
3. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace* (Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 69 - 71.
4. J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944 - 1956 (diaries), vols. I - II (Juva: WSOY, 1985 and 1986).
5. Max Jakobson, *Kuumalla linjalla. Suomen ulkopoliittikan ydinkysymyksiä 1944 - 1968* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1968), English version: *Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War* (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968); *Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953 - 1965* (Keuruu: Otava 1981) and 38. kerros. *Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965 - 1971* (Keuruu: Otava, 1983).
6. Risto Penttilä, *Finland's Search for Security through Defence: Defence Policy in the Stabilisation of Finland's International Position 1944 - 1967* (diss. manuscript, University of Oxford, 1988).
7. Tomas Ries, *Cold Will. The Defence of Finland* (London - Exeter: Brassey's, 1988).
8. See e.g. Nils Morten Udgaard, *Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), pp. 67 - 68.
9. Review of the development in the North, see Geir Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War 1945 - 1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
10. Olav Riste, *Was 1949 a Turning Point? Norway and The Western Powers 1947 - 1950*, in Olav Riste (ed.), *Western Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo, 1985), pp. 128 - 149.
11. Joint Planning Staff J.P.(47)56 (final), *Scandinavian Defence - Strategic Considerations 4.6.1947*. Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/65961.
12. See e.g. Örjan Berner: *Soviet & Norden* (Stockholm: Bonnier fakta, 1985), pp. 60 - 67. Ingemar Lindahl: *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal* (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 20 - 23.
13. See e.g. Falk Bomsdorf, *Sicherheit im Norden Europas* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp.149 - 164.
14. Lundestad (1980), pp. 54 - 56 and Wilhelm Agrell, *Bakom ubåtskrisen* (Helsingborg, 1986), p. 92.
15. Kullervo Killinen, *Kansainvälinen politiikka I* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1958), p.281.
16. Tuomo Polvinen, *Between East and West. Finland in International Politics 1944 - 1947* (Helsinki: WSOY, 1986), pp. 24 - 36.

17. Ibid. pp. 115 - 119. Zhdanov to Mannerheim 2.3.1945. Finnish National Archives (Valtionarkisto = VA), J.K. Paasikivi Papers V:4, also in Finnish Military Archives (Sota-arkisto = SArk) T 20362/1.
18. J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat I, pp. 90 - 93 and 149 - 153.
19. Francis Shepherd from Helsinki to Foreign Office 21.5.1945, PRO, FO 371/47408, N 5728 and 20.7.1945, N 7273.
20. War Office 29.8.1945, PRO, FO 371/50916. Chiefs of Staff Committee 30.8. and 4.9.1945, FO 371/50870.
21. Minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers on 20 September 1945, PRO, FO 371/50916.
22. U.K. Delegation from Paris Peace Conference 7.8.1946, FO 371/56185, N 10385/303 G 56.
23. Chiefs of Staff Committee memorandum 30.8.1945, FO 371/50870. Article 22 of Paris Peace Treaty with Finland 10.2.1947: "Each of the military, naval and air clauses of the present Treaty shall remain in force until modified in whole or in part by agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Finland or, after Finland becomes a member of the United Nations, by agreement between the Security Council and Finland."
24. E.g. War Office to the military attache in Helsinki 7.1.1948, FO 371/71404 and Air Ministry to Foreign Office 10.8.1948, FO 371/71404.
25. E.g. Minister Oswald Scott from Helsinki to London 6.1.1950. He remarked that the strength of the Finnish Air Force, 127 aircraft, was more than the allowed number in the peace treaty. Scott, however, recommended Great Britain to leave further interpretations to the Finns: "The Soviet Legation has consistently and deliberately frustrated all our efforts to discuss matters concerning Peace Treaty implementation, consequently no progress has been possible and it has been left to the Finns to interpret the Peace Treaty in the manner which suits them best." FO 371/86470.
The British air attache in Helsinki reported as late as 4.1.1951 that the Finnish Air Force had 54 Me 109 G fighters and 69 other aircraft, exceeding thus the allowed ceiling. However, the planes were obsolete, and the Finns had already expressed their intention to acquire some modern jet trainers. FO 371/94634.
26. See J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat II, p. 316. The Finnish Commander-in-Chief, General Sihvo, was sent by Paasikivi on 16 Nov. 1952 to ask the Soviet military attache Colonel Rybakov for release of the stored "excess war material". He replied that the Finns could use the material without restrictions.
27. Committee Report Puolustusrevision mietintö 10.3.1949.
28. SArk T 21645/1.
29. Minutes of the Defence Revision Committee meetings 2. - 3.8. and 14.9.1945. SArk T 19572/376.
30. See e.g. Roy Allison, *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 20 - 21. Finnish reactions in detail are reported in J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat I, pp. 557 - 577.

31. E.g. Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting 28.2.1948 on measures to counter the Soviet activity, e.g. preparations for creating a joint naval task force for the Baltic Sea and backing the Finnish government against the threat of a Communist take over. FO 371/71405, N 2258.
32. Article 1 of the FCMA Treaty: "In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its obligations as an independent state, fight to repel the attack. Finland will in such cases use all its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with the obligations defined in the present treaty and, if necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with, the Soviet Union.
In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union will give Finland the help required, the giving of which will be subject to mutual agreement between the Contracting parties."
Article 2: "The High Contracting Parties shall confer with each other if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 is present."
On the early interpretations of the treaty see e.g. Ulrich Wagner, *Finnlands Neutralität* (Hamburg: Christoph von der Ropp, 1974), pp. 37 - 50. See also Allison (1984), pp. 21 - 25.
33. Memoranda 3.3.1948, SArk PK 166/28 and 13.3.1948, SArk T 23828/FA 12.
34. Memoranda 25.1. and 1.2.1949, SArk T 23828/FA 12.
35. J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat II, pp. 126 - 129, 145 - 146, 166 - 168, 178 - 179, 209, 235 - 236, 303 and 419 - 420.
36. Ibid. pp. 145 - 146, 178 and 193 - 194.
37. E.g. Berner (1985), pp. 73 - 75 and J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat II, p.117.
38. Max Jakobson - Jukka Tarkka, *Finland's security policy after the Second World War in Aspects of Security. The Case of Independent Finland* (Vaasa: Commission Finlandaise d'Histoire Militaire, 1985), pp.250 - 251.
39. Ibid. pp. 252 - 253. On the negotiations concerning Porkkala see J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat II, pp. 497 - 511. For Soviet motives see Khrushchev Remembers. *The Last Testament* (ed. Strobe Talbot, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pp. 222 - 225.
40. On the radiation threat to southern Finland in the event of a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union in the early 60s see Gregg Herken, *Councils of War* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), pp. 138 - 139.
41. Vilho Tervasmäki, *Puolustushallinto sodan ja rauhan aikana 1939 - 1978* (History of the Ministry of Defence, Hämeenlinna: publications of the Institute of Military Science, 1978), pp. 373 - 382. Ries (1988), pp. 183 and 186.
42. Sakari Simelius, *Puolustusvoimien puolesta* (Memoirs, Juva: WSOY, 1983, pp. 157 - 161. Jakobson (1981), pp. 293 - 302.
43. Ermei Kanninen, *Den finländska försvarsmaktens anskaffningar av krigsmateriel efter andra världskriget jämte därmed sammanhängande politiska beslut. In Krigsmateriel-anskaffning. Föredrag vid nordiska historikermötet i Reykjavik 1987* (Stockholm: Militärhögskolan, 1987), pp. 35 - 36.

44. General Headquarters, *Puolustuslaitoksen kehittäminen 1960-luvulla* (Helsinki: Pääesikunta, 1962).
45. Simelius (1983), p. 170.
46. Jakobson (1981), pp. 210 - 220.
47. The Finnish text of the Soviet note of 30.10.1961 can be found in *Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1961*, pp. 210 - 213.
48. Simelius (1983), p. 173.
49. Ibid. p. 174.
50. Ibid. p. 177.
51. Jakobson (1981), pp. 247 - 260.
52. See e.g. Penttilä (1988), pp. 292 - 306. Raimo Väyrynen, *Stability and Change in Finnish Foreign Policy* (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston valtio-opin laitos, N 60/1982), pp. 71 - 87, considers that the MLF plan was a threat to the Soviet Union.
53. Jakobson (1981), pp. 220 and 261 - 262.
54. Urho Kekkonen, *A President's View* (London: Heinemann, 1982), p. 69.
55. Ibid. pp. 48 - 49.
56. Urho Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (London: Heinemann, 1970), pp. 112 - 113. Also in *A President's View* (1982).
57. Jakobson - Tarkka (1985), pp. 258 - 259. Lindahl (1988), pp. 77 - 81.
58. *Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1965* and Jakobson (1983), pp. 24 - 28.
59. Simelius (1983), p. 182.
60. Quoted in Jakobson (1983), pp. 23 - 24.
61. Simelius (1983), pp. 277 - 279.
62. On the detailed organisation, see Ermei Kanninen - Vilho Tervasmäki, *Development of Finland's national defence after the Second World War in Aspects of Security* (1985), pp. 272 - 274.
63. Jakobson (1983), pp. 242 - 245 and Urho Kekkonen, *Kirjeitä myllystäni* (Keuruu: Otava, 1976), p. 32.
64. Committee Report 1971: A 18. For an overview of the defence committees, see e.g. Kanninen - Tervasmäki (1985), pp. 275 - 276.
65. Jakobson (1983), pp. 244 - 245.
66. Committee Report 1976:37.
67. Committee Report 1981:1.
68. Puolustusneuvosto (Defence Council), directions 7.4.1977.
69. Committee Report 1981:1, p.36.
70. Ibid. pp. 43 - 45.
71. Ibid. p. 44.
72. E.g. Tomas Ries, Finland's Armed Forces, *International Defense Review* 3/ 1984, pp. 333 - 334.
73. J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat II, p. 250.




Figure 1 Geostrategy of the Baltic Sea region in the 1950s

Source: Kullervo Killinen, *Kansainvälinen politiikka I* (Porvoo 1958), p. 281




Figure 2 Structure of the territorial defence in late 1950s




Figure 3 Geostrategic situation in Northern Europe in the 1980s




Figure 4 Organization of the Defence Forces in the mid 1980s




Figure 5 Evolution of the Army battle doctrine

DOCUMENTATION

STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FINLAND AT THE SEMINAR ON MILITARY DOCTRINE, VIENNA, JANUARY 1990

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF FINLAND.

Statement by the Chief of the General Headquarters of the Finnish
Defence Forces, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg
Seminar on Military Doctrine
17 January 1990

Introduction

1. Finland participates actively in the CSCE process. This process is about co-operation and peaceful change. Negotiations on military security have become an indispensable part of the CSCE process. The goal of these negotiations is to reduce and eliminate the risk of war by promoting stability in Europe. The CFE negotiations are proceeding towards substantial results already this year. The CSBM negotiations are also characterized by a desire to produce significant results, which is eminently illustrated by this doctrine seminar.

2. Finland is a neutral Nordic state. Neutrality is the method of Finland's foreign policy. We endeavour to stay outside the conflicts of interest between the great powers and military alliances. We maintain friendly relations with our neighbours as well as all other States, and contribute to the security of our continent.

3. Finland's security policy has been shaped by geography and history.

4. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 prescribes certain military limitations on the quantity and quality of Finland's defence forces. These limitations do not, however, prevent an adequate development of our capabilities.

5. In the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, concluded with the Soviet Union in 1948, Finland provides guarantees that it will not allow its territory to be used for an attack against the Soviet Union.

6. We believe that no foreign powers have offensive interest in Finnish territory. A military threat to Finland could conceivably arise in connection with such a major European conflict which would entail a risk of involving our territory. Consequently, Finland's strategic significance depends on the extent to which, in the event of a conflict, Finnish territory could be used for military purposes. In order to deter any such use, Finland is prepared and intends to maintain a credible control of its territory and airspace by Finnish forces. It is crucial that our neighbours, as other countries, have confidence in our resolve and capability to control and defend our territory.

7. In our immediate security environment, the geostrategic focus has since the Second World War shifted from the Gulf of Finland to the southern part of the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the High North of Europe has gained new strategic importance.

8. All parts of Finland will be defended. Southern Finland with its centres of population, Lapland and, of course, the country's airspace are particularly vital for our defence.

9. Interdependence and stability characterize the situation in the Nordic region. There are no sources of conflict among the five Nordic countries themselves, and they respect each other's security policy solutions. The absence of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries is an essential factor of stability in the entire region.

10. The Northwest of the Soviet Union, bordering Finland and Norway, and the adjacent northern waters, are of major strategic significance. These

areas play, therefore, an important role for the central nuclear balance as well as for the security of the whole region. For Finland, regional stability is of primary importance.

11. We believe that the defence forces of the neutral countries are recognized as a contribution to European stability. In this respect, the defence of Finland remains an important factor in the North of Europe.

12. The fundamental objective of Finnish security policy is to maintain freedom and independence and to prevent the country from being drawn into war. To achieve this and to prevent the exploitation of its territory for hostile purposes Finland maintains a defensive capability. In addition, the Defence Forces provide a flexible instrument of crisis management.

Objective of
military defence

13. The objective of Finland's military defence is to make it prohibitively difficult for any potential aggressor to violate Finnish territory. The task of defence is to make an attack not worth the cost in terms of time, manpower and equipment lost by prolonged engagement in the Finnish direction.

14. In short, the ultimate goal is deterrence, not deterrence by punishment, but deterrence by denial of access. The military objective is, therefore, to raise the cost of attack higher than any conceivable benefit which the aggressor might hope to gain.

15. In order to make its military defence credible, a small neutral state must employ all the resources at its disposal.

Foundation of
national defence

16. Thus the Finnish Constitution obligates every citizen to take part in the defence of the country. Over 85 per cent of all men, i.e. 30.000 men annually, carry out their basic military service, of 8 to 11 months. Repeated refresher training is an integral part of the Finnish military service. Today, 50 000 men are annually called up for refresher training.

17. According to the Act of 1974, the principal tasks of the Defence Forces are, in addition to training:

- surveillance of the country's land and sea territory and airspace,
- protection of its territorial integrity, and ultimately
- defence of Finland.

18. Other significant tasks include United Nations peace-keeping activities. Today, Finland is one of the largest contributors of troops to the UN.

19. In addition to military defence, economic preparedness and civil defence are an integral part of the Finnish national defence effort. For example, there are stocks of vital raw materials, oil and lubricants to last for several months, should supplies from abroad come to a halt. Furthermore, the Civil Defence Act obliges every citizen to participate in the national effort to protect the population. The Act also prescribes construction of shelters. At the moment, there are hardened shelters for about 90 per cent of the urban population.

Doctrine:
1. Territorial
defence

20. The military defence of Finland is based on the concept of territorial defence. In particular, it has been developed to benefit from the country's special geographic and climatic conditions.

21. The Finnish military doctrine is non offensive. The defence of Finland begins at its borders.

22. The fully operational decentralized command and control system provides assurances against a surprise attack. At present, the peacetime command structure includes military areas divided into military districts. Military area commanders have full authority over preparations, readiness, mobilization and operations in their area. This system enables a rapid mobilization in every part of country.

23. As Finland has no fully combat-ready standing forces, but mainly training units, mobilization is vital. All peacetime units have two main

responsibilities. First, they carry out conscript and refresher training. Secondly, they also have certain readiness tasks. If needed, peacetime forces can be reinforced within hours by reservists to form various types of combat units. A fast deployment force of about 250 000 men, comprising the best-equipped Army brigades, the Frontier Guards, the Air Force and Navy can be made combat-ready through accelerated mobilizing measures within a few days.

24. The fully mobilized wartime Defence Forces consist of approximately 530 000 men drawn from a pool of one million trained reservists. Time permitting, mobilization will be followed by a period of intense combat training. The bulk of these troops will be deployed within a week. Sparsely populated areas, such as Lapland, will receive reinforcements from central Finland.

2. Territorial defence system

25. In the concept of territorial defence, the Army occupies a pivotal position. It carries the main burden for repelling an attack.

26. We have categorized our troops into local and general forces. The local forces are equipped mainly with light arms and mines. They form a network covering the whole country and defend sensitive limited targets and perform delaying actions in their local surroundings. They are also prepared to carry out ranger- and guerilla-type operations.

27. The general forces of the Army will be concentrated to defend, hold and reoccupy key areas. While the main function of the local forces is to slow down and wear out the attack, the primary task of the general forces is to repel the aggressor. The system of territorial defence is a flexible one, using mobility, battle endurance and exploitation of terrain to the fullest extent possible. Both types of forces provide support to each other in their respective primary tasks. In terms of numbers, in the fully mobilized Army there will be more than two hundred battalion- and company-sized local units, while the general forces will include two armoured and 25 infantry brigades.

28. The Navy and Air Force play a particularly important role in safeguarding Finland's neutrality and territorial integrity. In defending the country against an invasion they have a role complementary to that of the Army.

29. Naval defence is mainly responsible for reconnaissance and the surveillance of territorial waters, repelling intrusions and delaying amphibious attacks. Its duties also include the control and protection of sea lines of communication. The principal areas of operation are, first, the large southwestern archipelago including the Åland Islands and, secondly, the inlet to the Gulf of Finland and the waters adjacent to the capital city of Helsinki.

30. Control of the airspace is for Finland – as for all countries – an especially demanding strategic and financial challenge.

31. The main responsibility of air defence is to prevent violations of Finnish airspace. Therefore, the principal tasks of our Air Force are surveillance, interception and reconnaissance. In times of crisis and war, the limited air defence capabilities will be devoted to protecting vital national assets and, thereafter, to give support to the Army and the Navy.

32. The Frontier and Coast Guard units, trained and equipped like regular military units, are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. These units are of high professional military standard and can, if needed, be partly or wholly integrated into the Defence Forces.

3. Allocations

33. Finland allocates currently about 1.5 per cent of its GNP to military defence. When such items of related expenditure as the Frontier Guards, civil defence and economic preparedness are included, the share of national defence will amount to approximately two per cent of the Finnish GNP.

34. One third of the military defence budget is allocated to procurement. About 40 per cent of the

defence material is produced in Finland. The rest is procured from abroad. Main foreign suppliers are the Soviet Union, Sweden, France, Great Britain and the United States.

35. At the moment Finland is reorganizing its defence system. In principle, the territorial defence system will remain intact, but in order to increase flexibility, resources and responsibilities will be allocated further down in the chain of command.

In conclusion

36. Self-defence is the inherent right of all States, large or small. Every independent State has the right to defend its independence and to safeguard the lives and well-being of its citizens.

37. The Defence Forces are an integral part of the Finnish society, and they are firmly anchored in history. The Finnish people are today as determined to defend their country as they were fifty years ago.

THE POSTURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES

Statement on item 3.A by Major General Matti Kopra
Seminar on Military Doctrine
24 January 1990

In his presentation of the military doctrine of Finland last week, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg outlined the general features of Finland's security policy. Finland maintains defence forces in order to safeguard her independence, freedom and territorial integrity. At the same time we are aware of the obligations of a neutral country in this regard. Finnish security policy rests on two pillars; foreign policy and defence policy. With this security policy we have contributed in the past – and will do so also in times to come – to the stability in our own region, the Northern part of Europe. This, we believe, has also been a contribution to the stability of the whole continent.

Finland's security policy has been shaped by geography and history. Based on lessons learned, and tailored to our specific social, economic, geographic and climatic conditions, the military defence of Finland is a striking example of the concept of territorial defence.

Therefore I am happy to have the opportunity to explain today in some more detail the posture and structure of the Finnish armed forces, whose defensive character no one seems to contest.

Command of the Military Defence

The President of the Republic is in charge of the two most important areas of the security policy of Finland, namely foreign policy and national defence. He is the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces. In this capacity, he is advised by the Defence Council, whose members include the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, the highest ranking soldier, is directly subordinate to the President in matters of military command. Another chain of command stems from the Ministry of Defence. In addition, Parliament oversees the Defence Forces through legislation, especially when passing appropriations for national defence.

The Commander-in Chief of the Defence Forces is responsible for military defence. He is in charge of readiness, training, procurement and other military activities, as well as of research and development.

The General Headquarters is the command headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. It is divided into four sections: the General Staff and separate staffs for training, logistics and war economics.

The Finnish territorial defence system is based on the division of the country into seven operational military areas, which are further divided into military districts. Also the Navy and the Air Force operate within this basic territorial framework. The military areas, the Navy and the Air Force are under the command of the Commander-in Chief of the Defence Forces.

According to the Finnish territorial defence system, we must in times of crisis or war be able to carry out military operations throughout the country. The defence of the country begins at its borders. The aggressor will be slowed down and worn out, and his advance into the vital parts of the country will be prevented at all cost.

Peacetime
deployment of
Defence Forces

In peacetime, basic and refresher training is carried out in garrisons. These garrisons are located all over the country. Southern Finland with its centres of population, Lapland and the country's airspace are particularly vital for our defence.

In Northern Finland we maintain in peacetime for training preparedness three light infantry brigades – so-called Jaeger Brigades – as well as an anti-aircraft regiment and an Air Force wing.

For the total defence of the country, the main focus is in Southern Finland. Our largest industrial centres, the main administrative institutions as well as the majority of the population are there. For this reason, most of the garrisons and peacetime troops are in Southern Finland.

Naval defence includes two components: the stationary coastal defence and the Navy. It is responsible for reconnaissance and the surveillance of territorial waters as well as repelling intrusions and amphibious attacks.

The Navy has two main bases on the southern coast. These naval bases function as naval logistics and training centres. Coastal artillery units are deployed in fortified positions along the southern and southwestern coasts as well as in the archipelago.

The principal tasks of our *Air Force* are surveillance, interception and reconnaissance. Air operations are carried out by three Air Defence Wings, which are located in Northern, Central and Southern Finland. The deployment of flying units can be flexibly changed

to support any military area. For this purpose, seven major air bases and number of highway airstrips are maintained. Besides, all civilian airports can be utilized.

A network of long-range radars is supplemented by mobile and stationary low-altitude radars. Air surveillance is complemented by the Frontier and Coast Guards and the air-traffic controls of the National Board of Aviation.

Most anti-aircraft troops are organizationally part of the Army, but their fire control is integrated into the overall air defence. Our anti-aircraft system is at the moment undergoing an intense modernization programme.

Preparedness

The strength of our peacetime defence force is about 40.000 men. In their basic preparedness, they carry out surveillance of the Finnish land and sea territory and airspace 24 hours a day. Command, control, communications and intelligence systems are also continuously operational.

Preparedness is vital for our territorial defence. Accordingly, the military districts have the main responsibility for mobilization. Training units have two peacetime functions. They have their training responsibilities, and they secure mobilization. Defensive operations can be quickly launched even in the case of surprise attacks, since the training units are the initial force to be mobilized.

Mobilization is a key element in our defence. It will cover the whole country and will be implemented mainly by mobilizing small units close to their areas of operation.

During a threat of war, forces can be flexibly generated to match any level of threat. The idea is to first reinforce the training units and then, if required, mobilize wartime units. A force of about 250.000 men, which we call a fast deployment force, can be

mobilized through accelerated measures within a few days.

This fast deployment force comprises most units of the Frontier Guards, units for reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-aircraft units as well as up to 13 Army brigades. At this stage, the Navy and the Air Force will have some 90 per cent of their wartime strength. The fast deployment force is equipped with modern armament and equipment to intensify surveillance and reconnaissance, to repel violators of the territory and to protect vital military and civilian objects.

If and when needed, Finland is ready for total mobilization. The fully mobilized wartime Defence Forces consist of approximately 530.000 men drawn from a pool of one million trained reservists.

The mobilized troops are divided into local and general forces and support troops. *Local forces* form a basic network for our territorial defence system. They carry out local defence, surveillance, guarding and delaying actions. They are also capable of ranger-type warfare in the rear of the aggressor. The mobile *general forces*, army corps and brigade level formations, detachments and other units are intended for strategically important operations. They will be deployed upon the infrastructure set up by the local forces. The backbone of the wartime Army will comprise 11 modern jaeger brigades (type Brigade 90), 14 infantry brigades of an older type (Brigade 89) and two armoured brigades. *Support troops* do not participate in combat but carry out various service tasks to support combat troops.

Troops,
armament and
equipment

The jaeger brigade is the basic general-force formation in the Army. In its wartime strength, it will consist of four battalions, an anti-tank missile company, an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion and other necessary arms, 6.800 men in all. These wartime brigades (Brigade 90) are undergoing modernization. They will be armed with modern light weapons, light

and heavy mortars, field guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. Their communications systems will be integrated and automatic. The infantry in these brigades will be transported to the battle zone in their all-terrain vehicles or in armoured personnel carriers.

The local forces of the Army are organized into companies and battalions. The armament and equipment of the units depend on their tasks. Some of these units will defend local objects, such as air bases and ports. They are equipped also with heavy weapons, e.g. field guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The units which will stay and fight the aggressor at its rear, are equipped with light arms suitable for ranger-type warfare.

The Finnish coastal defence system exploits effectively our shallow waters and the extensive archipelago as well as the severe climatic conditions. For several months each year, most of our coastal waters are covered by thick ice.

The coastal defence system consists of fixed sensor and radar surveillance and a computerized command and fire-control network. Its chain of fortified light and heavy gun batteries are backed up by mobile missile and artillery units. The Navy has at its disposal two corvettes, 15 modern fast attack craft as well as mine layers, minesweepers and a number of auxiliary vessels. The fast attack craft are equipped with missiles. Almost every vessel has mine-laying capacity, which is essential in our shallow territorial waters.

In our defence system, the main emphasis is on the Army. However, we pay special attention to our airspace. The tasks of the Air Force are to prevent violations of airspace in peacetime and during a threat of war, and to intercept aggressors in wartime. These tasks are carried out by 60 all-weather interceptors. The Air Force also employs some 50 advanced jet trainers.

Procurement plans

During the past decade the focus of procurement has been in arming and equipping the new jaeger brigades and armoured brigades of the fast deployment force. This trend will prevail up to the mid 90s when the modernization of the interceptors of the Air Force will begin. Air Defence will be developed also by acquiring medium-range surface-to-air missile systems. The Navy will get a missile craft unit in addition to the two already existing.

The Finnish Defence Forces have been developed taking into account the large size of our territory, the harsh climatic and geographic conditions and our national resources. It is not for us to change these conditions. Instead, we make maximum use of them. That is why we are convinced of the capability of our Defence Forces to fulfil their mission.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND MILITARY TRAINING IN THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES

Statement on item 3.B by Major General Matti Kopra
Seminar on Military Doctrine
30 January 1990

To a large extent, the defence of Finland relies on mobilization. As previously stated by my delegation, our peacetime units have two main tasks: to train personnel and to keep up permanent preparedness. Training takes place separately in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Frontier and Coast Guards, which are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, employ the same training principles and procedures as the Defence Forces.

Training of those liable for military service

Under the Conscription Act, all Finnish men between the ages of 17 and 60 are liable for military service. When not in active service, a man belongs to the reserve until the age of 50 or 60 years depending on military rank or specialization.

A conscript may be exempted from active service in peacetime on medical or ethical grounds. More than 85 per cent of all men perform their national service in full.

The training of those liable for military service consists of conscript training and refresher training for reservists.

The length of *conscript service* is 240, 285 or 330 days depending on rank and specialization. Each age class enters service in five contingents in the course of two years. Each contingent consists of about 12.000 men.

The conscripts go through an identical basic training period of ten weeks in all services. This ensures that every Finnish reservist has similar basic military skills. These skills include the use of light anti-tank weapons, demolition works and survival in small independent units. This is essential for ranger-type warfare and our territorial defence system. The basic training is followed by specialized training tailored to the needs of each service. Because of our small-unit tactics, we emphasize the independence and initiative of commanders on all levels.

On the average, 8 per cent of the conscripts are trained to be reserve officers, 28 per cent to be reserve non-commissioned officers and 64 per cent for tasks in the ranks.

Refresher training is based on the Conscription Act under which those liable for military service can be called up for refresher training. The maximum total amount of refresher training, carried out at different times, is 40 to 100 days depending on rank and specialization. Each year about 50.000 men are called up.

Refresher training includes exercises for commanders and other key personnel, for units and headquarters, and for mobilization personnel.

All personnel in charge of key duties in units and headquarters are trained in special courses. For the performance of the units, the training of this personnel is crucial. The so-called fast deployment force – which is to be mobilized first – has naturally a priority in refresher training.

Refresher training for combat units and headquarters is carried out usually in periods of 7 to 14 days. After this training, the units can be rapidly mobilized. They will be quickly combat-ready and, time allowing, capable of starting combat training on their own.

Training of regular personnel

The strength of the regular personnel of the Defence Forces is about 21.000. Half of them are military. The training of all regular officers and warrant officers is carried out at the institutions of military education and training as well as in the units.

The basic training of officers is given at the *military academies*. The cadet courses in these academies now last for three years, but will be extended to about four years in 1991. The general aim is to educate officers to be company-level commanders in wartime. Approximately 120 lieutenants graduate each year.

The first task of an army lieutenant is to train conscripts as their platoon leader. In the Air Force, practically all junior officers are fighter pilots. Their training is concentrated on air combat. The dissimilar-type air combat training is continuously carried out in every squadron. In the Navy, lieutenants are trained for special tasks aboard combat ships.

After three to four years, an officer attends a *captain course* of his service and arm. This course lasts 8 to 10 months. Officers who have completed this course are qualified to be wartime battalion-level commanders.

The *general staff officer examination* qualifies to the ranks of colonel and above. It aims at educating officers to be wartime brigade-level commanders.

The examination is taken in the War College after courses lasting two to three years. Some 70 majors graduate as general staff officers from the War College every second year.

The field training of active-service officers takes place in different parts of the country so as to acquaint them with the specific geographic conditions of each area.

The basic training of warrant officers is provided at the *Warrant Officer School* and other institutions of military education. Basic training lasts for about two years. In addition to this, there is a training period of six months in units. This training qualifies warrant officers to be wartime company-level commanders.

The Finnish military training system allows for no shortcut for regular personnel. All our officers have completed their national service as conscripts. They have begun their careers from the lowest level and are thus thoroughly familiar with the life of the ordinary private, seaman or airman.

Exercises

The exercise programme has been geared to test and improve the Finnish territorial defence system. Every second year, the Defence Forces organizes a major exercise with approximately 10.000 to 15.000 men participating. On a lower level and in a smaller scale, brigade- and battalion-level manoeuvres are organized under military area command. Also, operational air defence training, combined naval defence exercises and joint staff exercises of all services are regularly included in exercise programmes. However, the main emphasis is put on battalion- and company-level exercises in local training areas.

Peace-keeping activities

Finland has participated in the UN peace-keeping operations since 1956. To this day, almost 26.000 Finnish soldiers have participated in various UN missions.

About 90 per cent of the Finnish peace-keepers are

reservists, who participate in the operations on a voluntary basis.

At the moment, almost 1 900 Finnish soldiers are serving under the UN flag. We maintain battalions in Lebanon, Golan and Namibia, and contingents and observers in Kashmir, Cyprus, the Middle East and Afghanistan as well as in Iran and Iraq.

A special UN Training Centre has been set up in Finland to train peace-keepers. Besides, the Centre contributes to the joint Nordic training of UN military observers.

Other duties
of the FDF

The Defence Forces are legally obliged to provide assistance to other authorities when requested. Such assistance includes search and rescue operations, forest fires and other natural catastrophes.

Qualified and motivated people are essential for the military defence of Finland. Therefore, the Finnish Defence Forces emphasizes the importance of educating and training its personnel. By intense, disciplined and continuous training we make sure that every Finnish soldier can and will defend his country.

MILITARY BUDGETING AND PLANNING IN FINLAND

Statement on item 3. C by Dr. Pauli Järvenpää

Seminar on Military Doctrine

31 January 1990

Military budgeting and planning does not, of course, take place in a vacuum. The Finnish system of territorial defence is a purely defensive system. It is also a system that places special demands on the structure and training of troops.

This, together with the particular climatic and geographic conditions prevailing in the North, puts

special requirements on the kinds of military equipment to be used. Mobility, for example, is better to be based on light armoured personnel carriers and all-terrain vehicles rather than on heavier armoured vehicles. Let me give another example. Since the bulk of the weapon systems will be used by the reservists, most of these systems must be fairly simple to handle, yet effective.

These considerations are reflected in Finland's military budgeting and planning. With relatively low military budgets, we have been able to create a viable military posture.

Defence budgeting is an integral part of national budgeting and planning. The national budget is prepared by the Government to be approved by Parliament. All defence expenditure is included in the budget, which is a public document.

Budgetary planning, carried out by the Defence Forces Headquarters, consists of three overlapping stages: a long-term plan extending over 15 years, a medium-term plan covering 5 years, and a short-term plan that in fact is the same as the annual budget proposal submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Finance. The long-term plan is renewed every 5 years and the medium-term plan every year.

The long-term plan is an internal planning device for the Defence Forces. It sets objectives and draws guidelines for the development of the Defence Forces over the next 15-year period. It is based on the projected long-term trends affecting Finland's security environment, including demographic changes and advances in military technology.

While the long-term plan is an internal planning guideline for the Defence Forces, the medium-term plan is strictly guided and shaped according to the financial and personnel resources allocated by the Ministry of Finance in its general guidelines for budgetary planning. The medium-term is worked out in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. The

emphasis in the medium-term plan is placed on procurement and systems development.

The short-term plan covers essentially the first year of the medium-term plan, supplemented by budgetary needs that have arisen during the year's planning process. In its final shape the plan is the budget proposal of the Ministry of Defence that in due course will be discussed by the Government and considered in Parliament, which makes the final decisions on appropriations.

Defence appropriations are normally approved for one fiscal year only. However, for major weapons programs it is possible for Parliament to approve special "procurement authorizations", spanning a period of several years. Even such authorizations must be annually reaffirmed by Parliament.

As noted above, defence budgets are subject to thorough public scrutiny in Parliament. Since the early 1970's there have been a number of ad hoc Parliamentary Defence Committees. They have provided a forum for defence debates and parliamentary input on national defence policy formulation. The Committee recommendations have, for example, provided planning guidelines for the Defence Forces long-term plan I already referred to.

Now to the question of resource allocation. Budgetary practices vary considerably from one country to another. In Finland, the budgetary term "military expenditure" refers to a national budget heading that covers all the financial resources allocated to the Defence Forces each year. This includes the salaries of personnel, procurement of defence materiel, operations and maintenance costs, maintenance of conscripts as well as real estate and construction costs.

That budget heading also includes the Ministry of Defence administrative costs, Finland's United Nations peace-keeping expenses and the cost of running the production plants administered by the ministry of Defence.

For the fiscal year 1990, 7.2 billion Fmk, or about 1.8 billion US dollars at the present rate of conversion, was allocated to the Defence Forces under the budget heading of military expenditure. That sum can be broken down to the following major expense categories: 29 per cent of the total will be spent on salaries, 33 per cent on procurement of new defence materiel, 16 per cent on operations and maintenance, and 9 per cent on maintenance of conscripts.

The total defence budget is estimated to represent a little less than 1.5 per cent of Finland's Gross National Product (GNP) and about 5 per cent of the total national budget. However, there are certain defence-related costs that do not appear in the national budget under the heading of military expenditure. Such expenses include, for example, the running costs of the Frontier and Coast Guards, which in peace-time are budgeted and administered by the Ministry of the Interior, but which can be partially or fully integrated into the Defence Forces in the event of crisis or war. Furthermore, the defence budget does not include the costs of civil defence construction or the costs of economic preparedness (emergency stockpiling). Neither does the defence budget include military pensions or social benefits to the families of the conscripts.

In terms of resources expended all of these items mentioned here are relatively small. If all of them are counted in, the total sum spent on national defence will amount to about 2 per cent of GNP.

The figures presented here have remained stable for the past quarter of a century. In the years 1972-89, the average annual growth rate of the defence budgets was about 3.7 per cent in real terms. The relative scarcity of funds available for national defence has meant that priorities must have been set with great care.

Let me illustrate this point: With the Navy getting a relatively constant share of around 15 per cent of the

budget, the choice for special focus has been between the Air Force and the Army. When the Air Force needs were held as a priority in the late 1970's with the purchase of fighters and jet trainers, the Air Force's share of the materiel acquisition budget was about 50 per cent. At that time, the Army received about 30 per cent of the budget.

An Army modernization program was launched in the early 1980's. Since then the Army has received the lion's share of the budget so that about a half of the new acquisitions have gone to the Army. There will be another shift in spending priorities towards air defence in the middle of this decade, when the Air Force fighter squadrons will be modernized.

What about the future? It seems fair to say that the future portends some especially severe challenges for the military planning of a small neutral State. One such challenge is the cost of high technology. Finland now produces about 40 per cent of its defence material, while the rest of it is purchased evenly from East and West, as is fitting for a neutral country. The domestically produced weapons include light arms, mortars, heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers, fast attack craft, and, increasingly, communications equipment and other highly advanced electronics. Although most of the reserve forces can do with less sophisticated weapons, the quality of the equipment for the best-equipped forces will have to be maintained on a high level even in the future.

Another challenge will be the availability of the resources earmarked for national defence. This problem is particularly acute as the prices of defence equipment have in the 1980's risen at an annual average rate of about 6 per cent in real terms over the prices of other goods, and in some categories of defence equipment even faster. One consolation may be that this seems to be a predicament faced by defence planners and decision-makers in all countries, large or small.

Finland's military budgeting and planning is an integral part of the country's defence policy. Its aim is to create and maintain such a defence capability that the country's defensive military posture can be sustained. In our view, by doing our share and doing it well we can best contribute to the security and stability of Europe in our own northern corner.

